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NOTES
FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION: DEFINING INVESTMENT
BANKERS' DUTY TO THIRD-PARTY
SHAREHOLDERS
INTRODUCTION
The 1980s was a boom decade for corporate mergers and acquisitions.
Although the actual number of corporate control transactions changed
little from the 1970s, the size of these transactions mushroomed,I culmi-
nating in the $25-billion leveraged buyout2 of RJR-Nabisco.3 Investment
bankers4 were at the center of these enormous deals, which required the
involvement of many professional intermediaries.5
Although investment bankers may play several roles in these complex
deals,6 use of their fairness opinions is so central to acquisitions of public
companies that their non-use "would probably raise eyebrows."' A fair-
1. See Rosenbloom & Aufses, On Understanding Investment Banker Liability, 4 In-
sights, Apr. 1990, at 3; Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control
Transactions, 96 Yale LJ. 119, 121 n.15 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Fairness Opinions].
2. A leveraged buyout is defined as a "takeover of a company, using borrowed
funds." Barron's Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 209 (1985).
3. For an interesting insider's look at the role of investment bankers in the RJR-
Nabisco deal, see B. Burrough & J. Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR
Nabisco (1990).
4. This Note refers to investment bankers as institutions, not individuals, and thus
substitutes "it" for "investment banker" throughout. When shareholders sue investment
banks for negligent misrepresentation, they really seek recovery from the investment
banking institution-the deep pocket-not the individual bankers themselves. The ex-
ception, however, is when the institution goes bankrupt. See eg., In re M.D.C. Holdings
Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,729, at 98,446 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 21, 1990) (shareholders suing individual investment bankers, including
Michael Milken, for negligent misrepresentation after Drexel Burnham's bankruptcy).
5. See J. Freund, Anatomy of a Merger: Strategies and Techniques For Negotiating
Corporate Acquisitions 471 (1975). These intermediaries are important given manage-
ment's frequent conflict of interest in corporate control transactions. See &L
Some commentators, however, look upon the intermediaries' role less favorably-as
camouflage for interested directors to achieve their aims. See, eg., Macey & Miller,
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 Yale L.J. 127, 141 (1988) ("(Ciorporate boards, aided by a
phalanx of sophisticated lawyers and investment bankers, can cloak result-oriented deci-
sion-making in the guise of careful deliberation."); Stein, A New Cloud Over Wall Street?
Investment Banking's Dirty Little Secret, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, § 3, at 2, col. 6 ("It is
an open secret in the investment community that the writers of 'fairness letters' are paid
huge sums to rubber stamp management's offer as 'fair.' ").
6. See generally Mancuso, The Role of the Investment Banker in Public Leveraged
Buyouts in Leveraged Acquisitions and Buyouts 241-61 (1986) (investment bankers may
sponsor or advise corporations in public leveraged buyouts).
7. Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Compa-
nies: Is "Third-Party Sale Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. Law. 1439, 1442
(1981); see also Bebchuk & Kahan, Fairness Opinionr How Fair Are They and What Can
Be Done About It?, 1989 Duke L.J. 27, 27 (1989) (fairness opinions are often used in
major control deals such as "negotiated mergers, freeze-out mergers, hostile tender offers,
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ness opinion evaluates whether a transaction is fair to the parties in-
volved from a financial point of view.' Corporate directors seek
investment bankers' fairness opinions for several reasons, 9 including the
assurance of a deal's financial soundness, because ascertaining the fair
price of a deal "is an economic and financial determination as to which
the investment banker's expertise is particularly fitted." 10
On occasion, however, an investment banker may fail to apply its ex-
pertise properly and opine negligently on a deal's fairness." Such negli-
gence may hurt all who relied on the fairness opinion, including
shareholders who lack contractual privity with the investment banker. 2
Recently, some courts have permitted third-party shareholders 13 to raise
friendly tender offers, self-tenders, leveraged buyouts, negotiated share repurchases ....
[and] negotiated sales of treasury stock") (footnotes omitted); Steinberg & Lindahl, The
Duty Owed to Minority Shareholders by an Investment Banker in Rendering a Fairness
Opinion, 13 Sec. Reg. L.J. 80, 80 (1985) (use of fairness opinions to influence minority
shareholders in tender offers or mergers is widespread), reprinted in M. Steinberg, Securi-
ties Regulation: Liabilities and Remedies § 15.07, at 15-42 (10th rel. 1990); Winter, On
"Protecting the Investor," 63 Wash. L. Rev. 881, 895 n.44 (1988) (obtaining fairness opin-
ion for the valuation of a merger is an "increasingly common practice").
8. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 7, at 27; Note, Fairness Opinions, supra note 1,
at 120. In particular, however, investment bankers are most concerned that transactions
are fair from the perspective of the hand that feeds them-the interested officers and
board members. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
10. M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, 1 Takeovers and Freezeouts § 8.0612], at 8-24.5 (11 th
rel. 1990); see also J. Freund, supra note 5, at 471-72 ("The basic financial terms of a deal
.. are peculiarly the province of the investment banker."); Chazen, supra note 7, at 1442
("Investment bankers have been held to be qualified professionals with regard to the
value of securities.").
In reality, however, most corporate directors seek these opinions to help sway share-
holders to approve deals and to satisfy their fiduciary duties. See Bebehuk & Kahan,
supra note 7, at 28; see also Chazen, supra note 7, at 1442 (fairness opinion important
because it may help to prove directors exercised reasonable business judgment); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876-77 (Del. 1985) (directors might have avoided a breach
of their fiduciary duties to shareholders by obtaining a fairness opinion). Furthermore,
investment bankers "are sometimes no better equipped to form an opinion as to the fair-
ness of a transaction than are the directors, particularly in transactions involving compa-
nies with substantial intangible assets, e.g., patents and trademarks, technological
information and other proprietary information." Note, Fairness Opinions, supra note 1,
at 135 n.89.
11. See, eg., Herskowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 182, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1988)
(investment banker allegedly rendered fairness opinion negligently), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1054 (1989); Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1124-25 (D.R.I.
1990) (same); Klein v. King, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,002, at 95,602, 95,615 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990) (same); Wells v. Shearson Leh-
man/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200, 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987)
(same), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d
517, 524-25 (1988); see also Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 159 A.D.2d 291, 296-97,
552 N.Y.S.2d 571, 574-75 (1st Dep't 1990) (investment banker provided allegedly negli-
gent advice to special committee on its auction of corporation).
12. See Herskowitz, 857 F.2d at 190; Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1124-25; Klein, [1989-
90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
26, 1990); Wells, 127 A.D.2d at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
13. Shareholders are third parties to the contractual relationship between the invest-
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state law claims against investment bankers for negligently preparing
fairness opinions, notwithstanding the absence of contractual privity. 4
Although under traditional tort principles the lack of privity bars third-
party shareholders from suing investment bankers for negligence, most
states have nevertheless rejected the traditional privity defense in negli-
gent misrepresentation suits involving professionals.16
These states are divided, however, over the appropriate scope of a pro-
fessional's duty to third parties."7 Moreover, courts have not given spe-
cific guidance on when investment bankers fail to meet this duty. So far,
ment banker and the officers or directors of the corporation. The corporation's directors
are not the agents of the shareholders from the traditional tort law perspective. See Con-
tinental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-18, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42 (1912); H. Henn &
J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 207, at 562-63 (3d ed. 1983); infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
14. See cases cited supra note 12; see also Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 296-97, 552
N.Y.S.2d at 574-75 (investment banker hired by special committee in privity with share-
holders and thus liable to them for negligently advising special committee on price's
fairness).
15. The privity defense in negligence actions first arose in Winterbottom v. Wright,
152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404-05 (Ex. 1842). As early as 1874, a court in the United States
required privity in a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. See Kahl v. Love, 37
NJ.L. 5, 8-9 (NJ. 1874); Bagby & Ruhnka, The Controversy Over Third Party Rights
Toward More Predictable Parameters ofAuditor Liability, 22 Ga. L. Rev. 149, 153 (1987).
The Supreme Court held in 1879 that an attorney could not be liable to third parties for
professional negligence, absent special circumstances such as fraud. See Savings Bank v.
Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200, 202-03 (1879). The seminal case, however, is Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), where the New York Court
of Appeals limited accountant liability in negligence to a "contractual relation, or even
one approaching it." Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. For a discussion of Ultramares, see
infra notes 105-109 and accompanying text. "For years, Ultramares served to validate
the use of the privity defense in nearly all types of professional liability suits based on
negligence." Bagby & Rubnka, supra, at 156-57 & n.36; see infra note 108 and accompa-
nying text.
16. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-93 (D.R.I. 1968) (ac-
countant liable to foreseen third-party corporation for negligent misrepresentation); Rob-
ert & Co. Assoc. v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250 Ga. 680, 680-82, 300 S.F_.2d 503,
503-04 (Ga. 1983) (engineer liable to third-party purchaser for incorrect report on condi-
tion of building); Collins v. Binkley, 750 S.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Tenn. 1988) (vendor's at-
torney found liable to purchaser for preparing defective deed); see also Bagby & Ruhnka,
supra note 15, at 157 n.37 (listing cases).
A professional is one whose work involves labor, skill, education, special knowledge
and compensation, but whose labor and skill involve a "high level of training and profi-
ciency." Black's Law Dictionary 1210 (6th ed. 1990). Examples of professionals include
accountants, architects, engineers, doctors, lawyers and investment bankers. All of these
professionals regularly make representations claiming special knowledge when rendering
a service arising from a contract involving pecuniary interest. The recipients of those
representations are entitled to expect that the professional will investigate all necessary
matters and will have the competence that the particular profession requires when form-
ing an intelligent judgment based upon the data obtained. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552 comment e (1965).
17. See, e-g., First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W. Va. 1989) (re-
quiring that professional actually foresee the third party's reliance); Credit Alliance Corp.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 551, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435,
443 (1985) (requiring that accountant actually foresee the third party's reliance and be
linked to the third party via its own actions); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 NJ. 324,
1991]
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courts have addressed investment-banker liability in negligence to third-
party shareholders only in pre-trial motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim."8 Because courts have yet to reach the merits of these cases, the
appropriate standard of care that investment bankers owe to third-party
shareholders when rendering fairness opinions still awaits judicial
definition.
Fairness and justice require that an investment banker's liability rea-
sonably relate to the risks that it assumed in fee negotiations with a board
of directors or a special committee. 19 This Note argues that investment
bankers owe a duty to third-party shareholders in rendering fairness
opinions, but that the scope of that duty should be limited to those share-
holders whose reliance was actually foreseen.
Part I briefly explores the role of investment bankers' fairness opinions
in corporate control transactions involving public entities and reviews
negligent misrepresentation-the most viable third-party cause of action
against investment bankers. Part II sets forth the different views on the
scope of duty that investment bankers owe to third-party shareholders
arising from the negligent preparation of fairness opinions. Part II con-
cludes that negligent bankers owe a duty only to those shareholders
whose reliance the bankers actually foresaw. Part III argues for clearer
judicial guidelines concerning the standard of care that investment bank-
ers owe to third-party shareholders when rendering fairness opinions.
Part III also provides examples of cases in which fairness opinions and
proxy statements were sufficiently detailed to warrant a board's reliance
upon them in satisfaction of the directors' duties to shareholders. This
Note concludes that investment bankers' duty to third-party sharehold-
ers requires them to investigate the subject company, reasonably analyze
the information retrieved, and thoroughly disclose the bases for their
opinions when rendering fairness opinions that third-party shareholders
rely upon.
352, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (requiring that third party's reliance be reasonably foresee-
able by accountant).
18. See e.g., Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (D. Del. 1991)(allowing motion to dismiss); Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105,
1125 (D.R.I. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss); Klein v. King, (1989-90 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990)(same); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200, 202-03, 514
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526
N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988); Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 1,
at 6 (discussing motions to dismiss in several investment-banker cases); see also Her-
skowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1988) (denying motion for
directed verdict, rejecting scienter standard, and remanding for application of materiality
disclosure test), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054 (1989).
19. A special committee consisting of disinterested directors may be appointed by the
board because of a conflict of interest in the subject transaction. The courts consider the
use of a special committee as evidence of the board's fair dealing. See infra note 24.
[Vol. 60
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I. BACKGROUND: FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION
A. The Role of Fairness Opinions in Corporate Control Transactions
Involving Public Entities: Functions, Preparation and
Susceptibility to Abuse
Fairness opinions are "short letters that state an opinion about
whether the consideration in a proposed transaction is 'fair'" to the
shareholders from a financial point of view.' An investment banker usu-
ally addresses this letter to a special committee of the board of directors,
which then publishes it in a proxy statement to all shareholders in ac-
cordance with securities law.2 ' Investment bankers deem a "fair" price
to fall "within a range of prices at which informed parties might strike a
deal, but not necessarily the highest obtainable price."' In corporate
control transactions, valuing the stock that is the subject of the transac-
tion is necessary to determine what price is fair;, the fairness opinion is a
common vehicle to establish the fairness of a price.24
20. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 7, at 27. If the investment banker opines nega-
tively on a deal, then the fairness opinion states that the consideration is "inadequate" to
shareholders from a financial point of view.
21. See 17 C.F.R § 240 14d-9 (1991).
22. Coffee, New York's New Doctrine of 'Constructive Frivity, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1990,
at 6 n.1, col. 6; see Fleischer, A 'Fairness Letter' Is Just An Opinion, N.Y. Times, June 8,
1986, § 3, at 2, col. 5.
23. Whether a deal's financial terms are fair to the acquired company's shareholders
is "[a] perennial issue in acquisitions of public companies." Chazen, supra note 7, at
1439.
24. See Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduci-
ary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630, 657 (1985); Winter, supra note 7, at 895 n.44; Bagley &
Golze, SEC Contemplates a Requirement of Substantive Fairness, Nat'l LJ., Feb. 5, 1990,
at S9, col. 4; supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Another common method to establish fairness is forming a special committee of in-
dependent directors. See Booth, supra, at 657; supra note 19; see also Alpert v. 28 Wil-
liams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 570, 473 N.E.2d 19, 26-27, 483 N.Y.S. 667, 675 (1984)
(special committee would "tend to negate a finding of self-dealing or overreaching"). But
cf Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CIS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,256 (7th Cir. 1986) (highlighting
defects in securing fairness via special committee of outside directors), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
Both fairness opinions and special committees are indicia of fair-dealing, but neither is
required by law. See, e.g., Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 151-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (fairness opinion not required by New York law) (citing Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A-2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985)); Oberly v. Kirby, No. 89-467 (Del. Nov. 19,
1990) (1990 Del. LEXIS 351, at *78-79) (fairness opinion not required by Delaware law);
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1106 n.7 (Del. 1985) (declin-
ing to hold that absence of special committee constituted unfair dealing); Seagraves v.
Urstadt Property Co., No. 10307 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 1989) (1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 155, at
*8-9) (Delaware law does not mandate implementation of either fairness opinions or spe-
cial committees to prevent unfair dealing); cf Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849
F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting requirement of retaining independent financial
advisor as prerequisite to invoking business judgment rule).
The ultimate valuation of fair price rests largely within the discretion of the lower
courts. See Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Bade, 37 N.Y.2d 585, 588, 338 N.E.2d 614, 616,
376 N.Y.S.2d 103, 106 (1975).
1991]
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Investment bankers limit their evaluations of fairness solely to finan-
cial matters.25 The focus of a fairness opinion is not on the merits of the
transaction, but rather the consideration that the shareholders are paid
for their stock in the target company.26
In addition to determining whether the buyers' offer falls within a
range of fair prices, fairness opinions serve several functions in corporate
control transactions. From the directors' perspective, fairness opinions
(1) offer an independent perspective on a deal's fairness, 27 especially im-
portant when directors have conflicts of interest that might hinder them
in establishing a fair price;28 (2) provide directors with possible protec-
tion from claims of breach of fiduciary duty;2 9 and perhaps (3) convince
shareholders to approve or disapprove a merger.30 From the sharehold-
ers' perspective, diligently prepared fairness opinions reduce (1) agency
costs by limiting the discretion of opportunistic managers31 and (2) the
25. See M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 10, § 8.06[4], at 8-28. Most fairness
opinions contain the words "from a financial standpoint," by which an investment banker
limits the fairness opinion to the transactions' financial considerations. When investment
bankers contract to perform a fairness opinion "from a financial standpoint," it is widely
believed that they limit their liability and have no duty to consider any non-economic
matters, such as the effect on the community, when valuing a security or corporation.
See id It should be noted that this belief has never been litigated, "nor is it likely to be
effective in cases where the investment banker has an advisory role or otherwise assists in
the transaction beyond merely providing [a fairness] opinion." Id.
26. See Mancuso, supra note 6, at 258.
27. See M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 10, § 8.02[l], at 8-9.
28. See J. Freund, supra note 5, at 471-72.
Another common method is the appointment of a special committee of directors to
represent the outside shareholders. See supra notes 19 & 24.
29. See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock- The Relevance of Substitutes,
73 Va. L. Rev. 807, 835 n.74 (1987); Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 134; see, e.g., Cottle
v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir. 1988) (fairness opinion is
factor in finding directors did not abuse discretion); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
876-77 (Del. 1985) (absence of fairness opinion is factor in court's finding that directors
were uninformed); In re Radiology Assoc., Inc., No. 9001 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990) (1990
Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, at *35-36) (same); Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 7, 1977, at 7, cols. 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1977) (fairness opinion is factor in
finding directors conducted thorough investigation), aff'd mem., 60 A.D.2d 552, 400
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1st Dep't 1977); see also Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the
Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. Law. 1437, 1453 (1985) (discussing the significance of Van
Gorkom); Note, The Business Judgment Rule, Due Care and Experts: How Much Infor-
mation is Enough?, 7 J.L. & Com. 225, 239 (1987) ("use of... outside experts will greatly
enhance the probability that a board's action" was adequately informed) [hereinafter
Note, Due Care and Experts]. Of course, however, the mere existence of a fairness opin-
ion will not protect directors, especially when it is inadequately prepared. See, e.g., Royal
Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,863, at 91,139-40 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (directors liable despite fairness opin-
ion).
The Model Business Act allows directors to rely in good faith on the evaluations of
professionals. See Chazen, supra note 7, at 1442 & n.17.
30. See Note, Fairness Opinions, supra note 1, at 123.
31. See id at 125-27. Such costs include those "of monitoring and restricting man-
agement behavior as well as the lost profits caused by managers' opportunism." Id. at
125.
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shareholders' information costs in evaluating an offer.32
The preparation of a fairness opinion involves numerous variables and
financial considerations that may lead two investment bankers to opine
differently on the same transaction. The initial variables in the valuation
process may include: (1) the type and structure of the transaction in-
volved,3" (2) the purpose of the opinion;' (3) the investment banker's
access to data;35 (4) the time available to prepare the opinion;36 and (5)
the investment banker's familiarity with the subject company and
industry.37
After reviewing these initial variables, an investment banker must
choose one or more valuation techniques. Commonly used techniques
include (1) discounted cash flow analysis; (2) evaluation of comparable
acquisitions; (3) valuation of comparative companies; (4) breakup analy-
sis; and (5) liquidation analysis. 38 Using one or more of these valuation
methods, investment bankers factor into the valuation numerous finan-
cial variables:
32. See id. at 126.
33. See Chazen, supra note 7, at 1443-50.
34. See Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 1, at 8.
35. See id
36. Cf Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 4.01,
at 60-61 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984) (in determining whether directors acted reasonably,
court should consider amount of time board had to acquire information before a decision
had to be made).
37. See Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 1, at 8. The more familiar an investment
banker is with the subject company, the less the need for an in-depth investigation. If the
investment banker is unfamiliar with the subject company, the investment banker and its
counsel should investigate the company by reviewing relevant documents concerning the
company, visiting principal company facilities, and interviewing key personnel. See id. at
8-9; see also M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 10, § 8.06[6], at 8-31 ("Independent
verification of the key issues should be made."). Visiting a company to evaluate its assets
independently becomes more important when the asset values are essential in determining
the corporation's value. See Bagley & Golze, su.pra note 24, at 10, col. 4.
38. See Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., No. 6293 (Del. Ch. May 6, 1988)
(1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64, at *32-34); Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 1, at 4; see also
Note, Fairness Opinions, supra note 1, at 137-39 (listing all but break-up analysis).
[The] discounted cash flow analysis, which calculates the net present value of
the cash flows generated from [the] ownership of the business entity plus a
residual or terminal value calculation designed to quantify the theoretical
perpetuity of the company's cash flows. [An] evaluation of relevant acquisitions
... [involves] the banker analyz[ing] the prices paid for companies comparable
with the business then under consideration .... [The] valuation of comparative
companies [is] based on freely traded minority interest value plus a premium for
control or a 'going private' premium. Under such an approach, certain finan-
cial ratios of the comparatives are assessed and compared to those of the subject
company in order to infer a value for the subject company. [A b]reakup analy-
sis... assumes that the units of the business will be sold separately and those
units are valued. A ... liquidation analysis'] assumes that the assets of the
business will be liquidated piecemeal. The price obtained for these assets less
the time value of money and the costs of liquidation are used to determine value
under this method.
Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 1, at 4.
1991]
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(1) historical financial results and present financial condition, (2) eval-
uation of management's projections for the next two to five years, in-
cluding ability to fund projected capital expenditures, (3) market or
replacement value of the assets, (4) evaluation of the management's
ability, (5) market information-historical and comparative price-
earnings ratios, market trends, comparative premiums for sale of con-
trol and general economic conditions, (6) evaluation of the timing of
sale of the business-can a better price be obtained later, and (7) can a
better price be obtained now. 9
The investment banker must report its assumptions, methods and con-
clusions clearly in the fairness opinion." Before a board of directors can
reasonably rely on the investment banker's opinion, however, an invest-
ment banker must defend its valuation in detail at a board meeting. 4'
Following the board's recommendation to proceed with the transaction,
the fairness opinion is commonly, if not nearly always, annexed to the
proxy statement,4 2 which is delivered to all shareholders of record to so-
licit their approval of the transaction.
The valuation of fairness is, however, prone to abuse and is "[t]he
weak link in the protections afforded shareholders in management
buyouts."43 Most importantly, fairness opinions are "judgments, not
statements of fact or prophecy,"'  based on a whole set of contingencies.
They differ substantially from audits, which involve evaluations of spe-
cific financial indicators at a given place or time in accordance with the
standards of the accounting industry. Furthermore, investment bankers
rarely opine that a price is unfair; instead, they refuse to render an opin-
ion or withdraw an opinion already rendered.45 Occasionally, during the
39. M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 10, § 8.0613], at 8-25 to -26.
40. See generally infra note 185 (listing recommended procedures for disclosing
investigation).
41. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 7, at 27-28; see also Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 126-27 (1979) (giving an example of invest-
ment banker's presentation to board).
42. An investment banker's representation on a deal's fairness reaches the sharehold-
ers via the proxy statement. The investment banker should be aware of whether a board
intends to use its fairness opinion in the proxy report because the banker crafts its engage-
ment letter to limit its potential liability to the intended recipients of the opinion. See
Wachtell, Hein, Levene, Chappell, Heins, & Barrows, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz's
Drafting of Indemnification Agreements and Engagement Letters for Investment Bankers
in Light of Recent Legal Developments 13 (February 20, 1991) (on file at Fordham Law
Review) [hereinafter Drafting Indemnification Agreements]. The investment banker's
opinion can be a powerful means of persuading shareholders to approve a board's propo-
sal. See Note, Fairness Opinions, supra note 1, at 123.
43. Oesterle & Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Share-
holder Wealth?, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 207, 249 (1988). Professor Fischel has concluded that
the fairness opinion is unreliable at best, and that its cost is little more than a "judicially
imposed tax" on control transactions. Fischel, supra note 29, at 1453. He has also found
that the opinion of those who put their money on the line is more valuable than the
opinion of disinterested investment bankers. See id. at 1452. But see Lipton, supra note
41, at 131 (fairness opinions are desirable and useful).
44. Fleischer, supra note 22, § 3, at 2, col. 5.
45. See, eg., Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 696 (2d Cir. 1980)
[VCol. 60
1991] INVESTMENT BANKERS' DUTY
mergers-and-acquisitions boom of the 1980s, the rendering of a fairness
opinion became a mere formality performed after a deal was struc-
tured;' investment bankers often had to conduct hurried investigations
of subject companies to meet the short deadlines that bidders had im-
posed on target companies for accepting offers.47
Another pitfall in the valuation process is an investment banker's ten-
dency to be partial to its client. Not surprisingly, most incentives en-
courage an investment banker to opine in favor of the interests of the
persons who hired it. These persons, often interested board members and
officers, seek to garner shareholder support to achieve or prevent a
change in corporate control. The investment banker's fee is usually
based on a percentage of the deal, with a minimum payment-far less-if
the deal folds," unless the banker was hired to block an offer.4 9 Refusing
(investment banker unable to opine on deal's fairness); FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 727 F.
Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (investment banker threatened to withdraw its opinion
unless corporation's board increased its offer to match increase in the corporation's stock
price).
46. See Stein, supra note 5, at 2, cols. 4-6; cf Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,139 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 29, 1976) (fairness opinion prepared "virtually overnight and without the necessary
time and deliberation for a fair evaluation"); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,712
(Del. 1983) (not only was fairness opinion prepared over long weekend, but what would
be a fair price was left blank until board meeting); EAC Indus. v. Frantz Mfg. Co., No.
8003, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 28, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Del file, at 9) (investment
banker "improvised" fairness opinion), aff'd, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
47. See, e.g., Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 155-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (directors forced to decide under imminent deadlines); Citron v. Fairchild Camera
and Instrument Corp., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,915, at
90,103-04 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (arm's-length adversary imposed time limit on board),
aff'd 569 A.2d 53, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 94,860, at
94,662 (Del. 1989); In re RIR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,712-13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (special
committee given 30 minutes to accept proposal).
48. See Stein, supra note 5, at 2, cols. 5-6; Note, Platinum Parachutes: Who's Protect-
ing the Shareholder?, 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 653, 669-70 & n. 120 (1986); Note, Outside Di-
rectors and the Modified Business Judgment Rule in Hostile Takeorers A New Test for
Director Liability, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 645, 649 & n. 10 (1989); supra note 197 and accom-
panying text; see, e.g., Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112, 1122 (4th
Cir. 1989) (in addition to initial $25,000 for opinion, investment banker would receive
another $75,000 if merger completed), rev'd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 96,036 (June 27, 1991);
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (Smith Barney
would have lost $75,000 bonus had outside company wrested control of board from ex-
isting directors), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987); Wallerstein v. Primerica
Corp., 701 F. Supp. 393, 395 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (Lazard Freres was to receive additional
$9 million if shareholders approved merger); In re Appraisal of Shell Oil, No. 8080 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 11, 1990) (1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *88) (Morgan Stanley received
$500,000 flat fee for services rendered and additional $3.5 million for the tender offer's
success); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200, 201, 514
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987) (Shearson Lehman received $750,000 for its opinion and
was promised an additional $3.2 million if the deal went through), rey'd on other grounds,
72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988). But see
Fleischer, supra note 22, § 3, at 2, col. 4 (defending the investment banker's objectivity
and proficiency in rendering fairness opinions).
Even when the investment banker's fee is not contingent upon the achievement of its
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to opine on a deal's fairness may cause the investment banker to lose a
client, as well as the business of other potential clients who may perceive
the investment banker as one who will not tow the line.50 Even if share-
holders later question the investment banker's opinion, indemnification
clauses offer an investment banker further protection from the financial
harm that might arise from a shareholder suit.5"
In addition, the board may limit the investment banker's investigation.
For example, the board may forbid the investment banker to consider
breakup or liquidation values or to shop52 the company to confirm the
adequacy of the buyout price.53 The investment banker may also render
a fairness opinion based on information supplied solely by the corpora-
tion's management,' which is especially problematic in deals involving a
management-led bid. Due to the numerous definitions of fairness-" and
the investment banker's need to consider a broad range of factors,5 6 an
investment banker has tremendous discretion when opining on the fair-
ness of a price.57
Even with these pitfalls in the valuation process, however, some courts
and commentators have noted that shareholders tend to rely on financial
experts' opinions.5" Although it is unrealistic to presume that every
client's interest, the desire to maintain a client for future business or to retain other cli-
ents under similar circumstances may still sway an investment banker to render an opin-
ion favorable to its patron's position.
49. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp., 794 F.2d at 257 (investment banker was an interested
"blocker" of transaction).
50. See, e.g., Anderson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430, 436-38 (D. Minn. 1984) (board
may have influenced special committee's process of selecting investment banker to avoid
fairness opinion contrary to its interests).
51. For a discussion of procedural protections, such as indemnification clauses, that
the investment banker may seek to include in its engagement contract with the board, see
infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
52. Shopping constitutes "canvassing dealers for the most favorable price, as in shop-
ping securities dealers for the best bid or offer." Barron's Dictionary of Finance and
Investment Terms 379 (1985).
The board may hire a separate investment banker to shop the company for additional
offers. For a discussion of investment bankers and shopping, see Mancuso, supra note 6,
at 258-60.
53. See Mancuso, supra note 6, at 258; Longstreth, Fairness of Management Buyouts
Needs Evaluation, Legal Times, Oct. 10, 1983, at 19, col. 3; Comment, Regulation of
Leveraged Buyouts to Protect the Public Shareholder and Enhance the Corporate Image,
35 Cath. U.L. Rev. 489, 533 & n.260 (1986); see also Bagley & Golze, supra note 24, at
10, col. 4 (SEC considering whether it is misleading to allow fairness opinions when all
procedures have not been completed).
54. See cases infra note 226.
55. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
57. See Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 7, at 29-37; see also Fischel, supra note 29, at
1452 ("By assuming sufficiently high future earnings, or a sufficiently low discount rate, it
is possible to come up with just about any [real value]."); Macey & Miller, supra note 5,
at 134-35 (fairness opinions are "notorious" for the degree to which investment bankers
can manipulate the valuation process to favor their clients' position).
58. See Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 822 (D. Del.
1974); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch. 1984); see also Note, Fairness
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shareholder relies on fairness opinions, 9 the blind reliance that unsophis-
ticated shareholders might have on the opinions of reputable firms com-
pounds the effect of a valuation process that often lacks impartiality
because of its dependency upon the discretion of the investment banker
and management.
Despite these problems, the Delaware Supreme Court in Smith v. Van
Gorkom 6 "accentuated the need for fairness opinions and.. . contrib-
uted to their ever-widening use" in corporate control transactions. 6 1 The
Van Gorkom court did not require directors to seek fairness opinions to
fulfill their fiduciary duties,62 but it did factor the directors' failure to
consult an investment banker on the fairness of the cashout 3 price into
its determination that the directors were insufficiently informed to invoke
the protection of the business judgment rule." Van Gorkum reflects the
Opinions, supra note 1, at 123 (investment banker's opinion can have "substantial im-
pact" on shareholders' vote).
Interested directors certainly hope that shareholders will rely on the fairness opinion.
See Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 7, at 80.
59. Whether all shareholders actually rely on fairness opinions before voting is debat-
able. For example, arbitragers seek only a premium on the stock and thus care little
about the fairness of the price. Other sophisticated shareholders recognize the pitfalls
involved in the valuation process and probably put less faith in the opinions. Less sophis-
ticated shareholders, on the other hand, may never even read the proxy statement-they
simply may want a deal that offers a premium well over their basis.
60. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Van Gorkum is often referred to as "Trans Union," the
name of the corporation that was part of the merger challenged in the case.
61. Stuntebeck & Withrow, Fairness Opinions Should Offer More Detailed Financial
Analysis, Nat'l LJ., June 13, 1988, at 22, col. 1; see Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876-77;
Chazen, supra note 7, at 1442; Fischel, supra note 29, at 1453; Note, Due Care and Ex-
perts, supra note 29, at 237-38.
Van Gorkom did not require that directors seek a fairness opinion; however, it sug-
gested as a general rule that the use of an outside valuation would be given substantial
weight in any duty-of-care suit. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875-78. Still, many have
belittled the Van Gorkom decision. See, ag., I R. Balotti & J. Finkelstein, The Delaware
Law of Corporations and Business Organizations § 4.7, at 101 (1986) ("[t]he decision has
sparked harsh criticism, even incredulity"); Fischel, supra note 29, at 1455 (describing
Van Gorkom as "surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law");
Borden, First Thoughts on Decision in Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 25, 1985,
at 4, col. 4 (describing Van Gorkom as "baffling" and "a distinct threat to the ability of
companies to attract responsible directors").
Despite the substantial criticism of Van Gorkom, "it is highly unlikely that the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, widely recognized as one of the nation's ablest and most exper-
ienced in matters of corporate law, would adopt a rule with such self-defeating
consequences." Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 135 (footnote omitted); see also Chittur,
The Corporate Director's Standard of Care." Pas, Present, and Future, 10 Del. J. Corp. L
505, 543 (1985) ("[Van Gorkom] is a long-overdue judicial affirmation of the need for
better informed directors and, consequently, more responsible corporate behavior.'.
62. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876.
63. "'Cashout mergers' involve a displacement of minority stockholders by majority
stockholders. The minority stockholders are involuntarily divested of their equity inter-
est in return for cash." Note, Minority Shareholders and Cashout Mergers: The Delaware
Court Offers Plaintiffs Greater Protection and a Procedural Dilemma-Wenberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457A.2d 701 (DeL 1983), 59 Wash. L. Rev. 119, 119 n.2 (1983).
64. See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 877-78 (Del. 1985).
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weight that courts have given to fairness opinions rendered by reputable
firms as long as the opinions have appeared reliable. 65 Only recently
have the potential pitfalls in the investment banker's valuation proce-
dures made courts more suspicious of the bankers' impartiality66 and
more open to allowing shareholder actions against them.
67
B. Negligent Misrepresentation: The Most Viable Cause of Action
Against the Investment Banker
In 1987, an intermediate New York appellate court in Wells v. Shear-
son Lehman/American Express, Inc.6s first recognized a third-party
shareholders' cause of action against an investment banker for negli-
gently opining on a transaction's fairness.69 Three other courts have
65. See Chazen, supra note 7, at 1442; see, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646
F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (directors' actions sufficient under business judgment rule in part
because board relied on outside experts including investment banker), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980) (fair-
ness opinion evaluating merger proposal important factor in showing directors' good
faith); Grynberg v. Farmer, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,683, at
98,584 (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 1980) (special committee's failure to consult with independent
counsel or financial advisor contributed to rendering sale of stock improper); Consoli-
dated Amusement Co. v. Rugoff, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,584, at 94,484 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1978) (defining first step in legitimate private place-
ment as seeking investment banker's advice); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d
557, 572, 473 N.E.2d 19, 27, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 676 (1984) (fairness opinion good proof
that freeze-out price fair); Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7, 1977,
at 7, cols. 1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1977) (seeking independent investment banker's
advice before making tender offer important factor in deciding that directors discharged
fiduciary duties), aff'd mem., 60 A.D.2d 552, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1st Dep't 1977); see also
Longstreth, supra note 53, at 19, col. 4 (fairness opinions provide strong legal support for
management's judgment).
66. See Bartlett, Delaware Courts Get Tough Toward Investment Bankers, N.Y.
Times, May 30, 1989, at D1, col. 1.
67. See, e.g., Herskowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988) (deny-
ing motion for directed verdict in favor of investment banker in shareholders' negligence-
based action against banker), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054 (1989); Dowling v. Narragansett
Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1124-25 (D.R.I. 1990) (refusing to dismiss sharehold-
ers' negligence-based action against investment banker); Klein v. King, [1989-90 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990)
(same); Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 159 A.D.2d 291, 296-97, 552 N.Y.S.2d 571,
574-75 (1st Dep't 1990) (same); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127
A.D.2d 200, 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987) (same), rev'd on other grounds,
72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988). But cf
Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (D. Del. 1991) (dismissing plain-
tiff-shareholder claim of negligent misrepresentation against investment banker because
plaintiff-shareholders not part of limited and foreseen class).
68. 127 A.D.2d 200, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 72
N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988).
69. See id. at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2. Six years earlier, a Delaware court had
rejected a direct cause of action for third-party shareholders against negligent investment
bankers. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 58,1981, slip op. (Del. Feb. 9, 1982), with-
drawn, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), reprinted in Note, The Standard of Care Required of
an Investment Banker to Minority Shareholders in a Cash-Out Merger: Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 8 Del. J. Corp. L. 98, 162-63 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Standard of Care].
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since followed."
Causes of action other than negligent misrepresentation may be avail-
able against investment bankers, but require shareholders to hurdle ma-
jor procedural and theoretical impediments. For instance, shareholders
could raise derivative7 or federal securities claims' against investment
bankers. These actions, however, have "encounter[ed] major barriers
that substantially inhibit their effectiveness." 73 As an alternative to de-
rivative or federal securities actions, some commentators have suggested
that negligent investment bankers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders.74
70. See Herskowitz, 857 F.2d at 190; Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1124-25; Klein, [1989-
90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615. But cf. Brug,
755 F. Supp. at 1258-59 (dismissing plaintiff-shareholder claim of negligent misrepresen-
tation against investment banker because plaintiff-shareholders not part of limited and
foreseen class).
Recently, the same New York court that decided Wells found an agency relationship
between the investment banker and the shareholders, thus avoiding the third-party liabil-
ity issue. See Schneider, 159 A.D. at 296-97, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
71. In derivative suits, a "shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation for harm
done to it." R. Clark, Corporate Law § 15.1, at 639 (1986). Before bringing the suit, a
shareholder first must make a demand on the corporation's board of directors to remedy
the alleged problem. See id § 15.2, at 640. Most jurisdictions also require that the share-
holder own shares of the subject corporation at the time of the alleged wrongdoing as well
as at the time of the suit. See id § 15.4, at 650. In addition, a third of the states author-
ize courts to require the shareholder to post security for the costs of the defendants. See
id § 15.5, at 652.
72. Several civil actions are available to shareholders via the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For example, the 1933 Act incorporates pri-
vate rights of action in the general anti-fraud provisions of sections 11, 12(1)-(2), and
possibly 17(a), as authorities are split on whether a private action should be implied
under this section. See Clark, supra note 71, § 17.4, at 744-749. Under the 1934 Act,
private rights of action include the "catchall anti-fraud provision" of Rule lOb-5. See id
§ 8.9, at 309, 312.
73. Coffee, supra note 22, at 5, col. 1. In particular, Professor Coffee notes that the
demand requirement and the business judgment rule, which the courts apply to board
decisions to reject derivative suits, effectively offset the effectiveness of the derivative suit.
See id at 6 n.3, col 6. But see, e.g., Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as
Boundaries for Derivative Suit Procedures, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 745, 753-54 & n.39
(1984) (describing derivative action as cost-effective means of deterring opportunistic be-
havior by agents, especially where there is only a one-time breach of fiduciary duty). The
professor also points to the shareholders' need to prove scienter in actions under Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 6 n.3, col. 6.
Not all courts require proof of scienter for federal securities violations. See, e.g., Her-
skowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988) (shareholders need not
prove scienter under section 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1054 (1989).
74. See, eg., Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 7, at 87-89 (banker should be held as a
fiduciary to shareholders because its knowledge of facts and skill in reviewing deals are
superior to average shareholder, and it expects shareholders to rely upon its opinion);
Note, Standard of Care, supra note 69, at 117-19 (shareholders' confidence in investment
bankers' superior knowledge should give rise to fiduciary duty); Note, Fairness Opinions,
supra note 1, at 136 n.94 ("investment banker arguably might owe a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders"). But cf Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 43, at 252-53 & n. 160 (advocating
fiduciary duty to corporation when fairness opinion drafted under conflict of interest or
without adequate investigation, but rejecting direct fiduciary duty from investment banks
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Nevertheless, courts have consistently rejected these suggestions.7 5
Shareholders may also argue that they are in privity with an investment
banker hired by a special committee and thus allowed to sue the invest-
ment banker under its contract with the special committee for negli-
gently advising the special committee on the committee's auctioning of
the corporation.76 Nevertheless, this would require a dubious finding
that a special committee of directors is the shareholders' agent-a severe
twist of textbook corporate law.7" Thus, negligent misrepresentation is
likely the most viable cause of action for shareholders against investment
bankers who negligently prepare fairness opinions upon which the share-
holders then rely.78
to shareholders because management-buyout litigation, already rampant, would
increase).
75. See, eg., Lewis v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., No. 8720 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990)
(1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *20-21) ("Plaintiffs do not claim, nor could they, that Cit-
icorp or Drexel owed a fiduciary duty to Leaseway shareholders."); In re Shoe-Town,
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9483 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990) (1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at
*21-22) (illogical to burden investment bankers with fiduciary duties because fairness
opinion not "absolute requirement" under Delaware law); Anderson v. Boothe, 103
F.R.D. 430, 441 (D. Minn. 1984) (noting investment banker "cannot be held liable for
breach of fiduciary duty to minority stockholders").
Courts have been less inhibited in finding investment bankers liable for aiding and
abetting a parent company's breach of a fiduciary duty to shareholders. See, e.g., Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.33, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,401, at 92,599 n.33 (Del. May 3, 1989) ("Although Was-
serstein was not a MacMillan officer or director, it is bedrock law that the conduct of one
who knowingly joins with a fiduciary, including corporate officials, in breaching a fiduci-
ary obligation, is equally culpable."); Anderson, 103 F.R.D. at 441-42 (refusing to dismiss
aiding and abetting claim against investment banker because banker's fee contingent
upon success of management's wishes); Richardson v. White, Weld & Co., [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,864, at 95,545 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1979) (false
opinion could make investment banker a co-conspirator, or an aider and abettor, of a
parent company's breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders).
76. This argument succeeded in Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 159 A.D.2d 291,
296-97, 552 N.Y.S.2d 571, 574-75 (1st Dep't 1990). For a further discussion of Schnei-
der, see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
77. The Schneider court found this agency relationship between shareholders and a
special committee. See Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 296-97, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75. Sev-
eral commentators have criticized Schneider's agency finding. See, e.g., Coffee, supra
note 22, at 6, col. 4 (Schneider's finding of privity "seems doctrinally incorrect");
Wachtell, Roth & Houston, Investment Banker Liability to Shareholders in the Sale-of-
Control Context, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1990, at 1, col. I (Schneider's view of legal relation-
ships "startling"); cf Brodsky, Investment Banker Liability to Shareholders, N.Y.L.J.,
May 3, 1990, at 4, col 5 (Schneider's theory "should be limited to buyouts" and not
confused "with well-established principles of accountant and attorney malpractice liabil-
ity"). For a discussion of Schneider's use of traditional agency principles in viewing the
director-shareholder relationship, see infra note 162 and accompanying text.
78. See generally Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 7, at 89 (investment banker should
be liable for negligent misrepresentation); Note, Standard of Care, supra note 69, at 112-
15 (same); cf Coffee, supra note 22, at 6, col. 6 (theory of constructive privity would rest
on stronger doctrinal grounds and allow state and federal law to interact sensibly).
Only a few courts have allowed this common-law action against investment bankers.
See, eg., Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1125 (D.R.I. 1990)
(investment bankers may be liable for negligent misrepresentation); Klein v. King, [1989-
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"Negligent misrepresentation is a false representation made by a per-
son who has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, though he
does not know that it is untrue, or even believes it to be true."'79 The
elements of negligent misrepresentation, like all actions in negligence, in-
clude duty, breach, actual and proximate cause, and harm.' To be liable
in a negligence action, the defendant must owe a duty to the plaintiff to
exercise reasonable care."1 Tort law usually requires that this duty be
owed to all foreseeable plaintiffs.8 2 In negligent misrepresentation in-
volving professionals, however, courts traditionally protected profession-
als from foreseeable third-party claims by limiting their duty to only
those with whom they shared privity.8 3 Although most jurisdictions
have discarded a privity requirement for imposing liability in negli-
gence," these courts have disagreed on the extent to which a profes-
sional's duty should be limited. 5
After establishing the defendant's duty of care, a plaintiff must prove
that the defendant breached this duty of care by misrepresenting a mate-
rial fact.86 The Supreme Court has held that under securities laws "[a]n
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reason-
able shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."'"
90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
26, 1990) (same); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200,202-03,
514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (lst Dep't 1987) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25,
526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988). But cf Brug v. Enstar Group,
Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (D. Del. 1991) (dismissing plaintiff-shareholder claim of
negligent misrepresentation against investment banker because plaintiff-shareholders not
part of limited and foreseen class).
Such claims are occasionally called "professional malpractice," despite being indistin-
guishable from other negligent misrepresentation claims. See Siliciano, Negligent Ac-
counting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 Mich. L Rev. 1929, 1933 n.19
(1988).
79. Black's Law Dictionary 1152 (4th ed. 1951) (citation omitted).
80. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, F. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Prosser and
Keeton].
81. See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 Vand. L Rev. 231, 236
(1966).
82. "It is no longer in dispute that one who renders services to another is under a
duty to exercise reasonable care in doing so, and that he is liable for any negligence to
anyone who may foreseeably be expected to be injured as a result." Prosser and Keeton,
supra note 80, § 104, at 719 (footnote omitted).
83. See id. § 107, at 746-47.
It should be said that drawing the line between professional and nonprofes-
sional services is not always easy and perhaps in the final analysis the real ques-
tion is whether or not the service provider is the kind of enterpriser who ought
in the public interest to be strictly accountable for harm resulting from the de-
fects in things transmitted in the course of rendering services.
Id. § 104, at 720.
84. See infra notes 102-30 and accompanying text. Some courts, however, still re-
quire privity. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
85. See infra Part IIA.
86. See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 80, § 108, at 753-54.
87. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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Several state courts have applied this definition to state law claims. 8
A plaintiff must then demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentation
was the actual and proximate cause of the harm by proving that she had
reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentation.89 Under federal se-
curities laws, a rebuttable presumption of reliance arises when a material
omission is found because of the "unreasonable evidentiary burden that
would be placed on an investor if he was required to prove a 'speculative
state of facts, i.e., how he would have acted if omitted material informa-
tion had been disclosed . . . or if the misrepresentation had not been
made.' "I Tort law generally finds such reliance "where special circum-
stances make it reasonable or probable that the plaintiff should accept the
defendant's opinion and act upon it."'" Some courts have found these
special circumstances in the investment banker-shareholder scenario,92
and have determined that the factual assumptions made within a fairness
opinion have such persuasive force that investment bankers should be
liable for those statements.93 Despite these findings, too few courts have
addressed shareholder reliance on fairness opinions under negligent mis-
representation claims to conclude that shareholders will not have to
prove actual reliance.94 Ultimately, courts may have to conduct mini-
88. See, eg., Rose v. Dobras, 128 Ariz. 209, 214, 624 P.2d 887, 892 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1981) (applying T'C's materiality definition to Arizona securities case); Rosenblatt v.
Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (TSC's materiality standard applies in
Delaware).
89. See Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1120 (D.R.I.
1990).
90. Id (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988)). "There is no need
to supplement this requirement [of showing materiality] with a requirement of proof of
whether a defect actually had a decisive effect on the [shareholders'] voting." Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970).
91. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 80, § 109, at 760.
Further than this, it has been recognized very often that the expression of an
opinion may carry with it an implied assertion, not only that the speaker knows
no facts which would preclude such an opinion, but that he does know facts
which justify it. There is quite general agreement that such an assertion is to be
implied where the defendant holds himself out or is understood as having spe-
cial knowledge of the matter which is not available to the plaintiff, so that his
opinion becomes in effect an assertion summarizing his knowledge.
Id. at 760-61 (footnotes omitted).
92. See Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1120; see also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 70
N.Y.2d 268, 286, 514 N.E.2d 116, 125, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804, 813 (1987) (rejecting conten-
tion that investment banker's projections were "mere opinions" that could not support
claim of fraud).
93. See Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1124; Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388
F. Supp. 812, 822 (D. Del. 1974); Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341 (Del. Ch.
1984); see also Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 7, at 80 (minority shareholders in cashout
mergers undeniably rely on investment banker's opinion); Note, Fairness Opinions, supra
note 1, at 123 & n.28 (investment banker's opinion can have substantial impact on share-
holders' vote).
94. Only the Dowling court has addressed this issue to date. See Dowling, 735 F.
Supp. at 1124. In Dowling, Salomon Brothers contended that the shareholders failed to
prove actual reliance on its fairness opinion. See id. The court, however, found that the
vote of the nonplaintiff-shareholders, which forced the plaintiffs to liquidate their stock
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hearings on each shareholder's or group of shareholders' contention of
reliance or adopt a rebuttable presumption in favor of shareholder
reliance.
95
Finally, a plaintiff must show damages. Courts traditionally hesitated
before compensating plaintiffs whose tort claims arose from purely eco-
nomic losses rather than from physical harm.96 This convention in negli-
gence-based actions would have completely sheltered investment bankers
from liability to shareholders--shareholders rarely suffer anything but
financial harm when investment bankers negligently opine on the fairness
of transactions. The majority of contemporary courts, however, permit
recovery for pecuniary injury arising from negligent misrepresentation. 9
Therefore, because shareholder reliance is expected and neither privity
nor non-pecuniary loss is required, investment bankers may be liable to
third-party shareholders for negligent misrepresentation when they negli-
gently render fairness opinions that shareholders rely upon.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTMENT BANKER'S DuTY TO THIRD-
PARTY SHAREHOLDERS ARISING FROM NEGLIGENT
PREPARATION OF FAIRNEss OPINIONS
In 1981, a third-party shareholder's claim against an investment
banker for negligently preparing a fairness opinion was rejected as "mer-
itless."98 Nevertheless, in light of recent holdings that investment bank-
against their will, satisfied the reliance element of the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim. See id.
95. A rebuttable presumption would avoid the impracticality of having every member
in a shareholder class prove actual reliance. Mini-hearings, however, would address the
reality that several types of shareholders rarely rely on the investment banker's fairness
opinion. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
A presumption of reliance might unfairly burden investment bankers unless courts al-
lowed bankers to defeat the presumption via disclaimers placed prominently within the
opinion that alerted shareholders to the opinion's limitations. Cf H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler, 93 NJ. 324, 351, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (1983) (involving accountants); Stanton &
Dugdale, Recent Developments in Professional Negligence-I: Accountant's Liability to
Third Parties, 132 New L.J. 4, 5 (1982) (same).
For a discussion concerning disclaimers, see supra note 174.
96. See Prosser, supra note 81, at 232.
97. See W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, Torts: Cases and Materials 1024 (8th ed.
1988); see, ag., Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1124-25
(D.R.I. 1990) (allowing third-party shareholder action in negligence to proceed for recov-
ery of economic loss allegedly caused by negligent investment banker); Klein v. King,
[1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,002. at 95,602, 95,615 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 1990) (same); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d
200, 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d
11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988). But cf Floor Craft
Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Ohio St. 3d 1, 8, 560
N.E.2d 206, 212 (1990) (in absence of privity, no cause of action permitted against archi.
tectural designing firm for purely economic damages resulting from negligent drafting of
plans); Siliciano, supra note 78, at 1941-51 (the economic loss doctrine's concerns about
excessive liability and moral hazards are still viable in negligent accounting cases).
98. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1348 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd on other
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ers owe a duty of reasonable care to third-party shareholders,99
investment bankers can no longer expect to be insulated entirely from
third-party suits."lo The issues most likely to divide courts are the scope
of the investment banker's duty and the standard of care that the invest-
ment banker must meet. 101
A. The Scope of a Professional's Duty to Third Parties
Courts have generally adopted one of three leading views on the scope
of a professional's duty to third parties: (1) the Ultramares approach; (2)
grounds, 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). The Weinberger court noted that no precedent
existed for such a cause of action. See id
99. See Herskowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1054 (1989); Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1124-25; Klein, [1989-90 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615; Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co.,
159 A.D.2d 291, 296-97, 552 N.Y.S.2d 571, 574-75 (1st Dep't 1990); Wells, 127 A.D.2d
at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2. But cf Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247,
1258-59 (D. Del. 1991) (dismissing plaintiff-shareholders' claim of negligent misrepresen-
tation against investment banker because plaintiff-shareholders not part of limited and
foreseen class).
100. See Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 1, at 7.
101. Another potential issue is whether the shareholders will have to show actual reli-
ance upon the fairness opinion. Although this Note discusses this issue briefly, see supra
notes 59 & 89-95 and accompanying text, a full discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this Note.
In addition, a few commentators have raised free speech questions in the context of
other professionals. See, eg., Siliciano, supra note 78, at 1966 & n.179 (raising first
amendment concerns in context of accountants); Note, Wat Standard of Care Should
Govern the World's Shortest Editorials?: An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75
Cornell L. Rev. 411, 446-58 (1990) (raising first amendment issue in context of bond-
rating companies). No court has addressed the freedom of speech issue in the context of
an investment banker's fairness opinion.
The first amendment affords special protection to speech of public concern, because
such speech "occupies the 'highest rung of the heirarchy [sic] of First Amendment val-
ues.'" Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 467 (1980)); see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-59 (1985) (plurality opinion). For speech on matters of public concern, negligence is
constitutionally insufficient to sustain liability. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The Supreme Court distinguishes a public concern from a pri-
vate concern by examining the speech's "content, form, and context ... as revealed by
the whole record." Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. See generally Note, supra, at 450-51
(compiling factors from cases that help distinguish matters of public concern from purely
private matters). In the context of large, publicly held corporations, a fairness opinion is
arguably of public concern: the economic well-being of a major corporation not only
affects its numerous shareholders, but also the nation's economy as a whole. Neverthe-
less, the investment banker's fairness opinion is generally of greater interest to a limited
class than the general public. Cf Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762 (defamatory bank-
ruptcy declaration not a public issue). In addition, the investment banker renders the
opinion for a profit-a motive less likely to garner him first amendment protection. See
id. Thus the fairness opinion is less a news item of public concern and more a private
evaluation to which the public is indifferent. cf Note, supra, at 460 (drawing a similar
conclusion in regards to accountant's audit).
A full discussion of these first amendment concerns is also beyond the scope of this
Note. For a more detailed discussion, see Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern:
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
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the reasonably foreseeable standard; or (3) the Second Restatement's ac-
tually foreseen approach." 2 Even though these three views have devel-
oped largely in the context of accountant liability, ' °3 many courts have
applied these standards to other professionals who negligently provide
information. 04
102. See Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 156-57 (7th Cir. 1987); First
Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 311-13 (W. Va. 1989); Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 553 & n.1 1, 483 N.E.2d 110, 119, 493 N.Y.S.2d
435, 444 (1985).
California courts have recognized a fourth definition of duty that balances policy con-
cerns including
'the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the fore-
seeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered in-
jury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the
policy of preventing future harm.'
Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 343, 556 P.2d 737, 742, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 380
(1976) (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958)); see also
Klein v. King, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 95,002, at 95,602,
95,615 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990) (acknowledging Goodman and holding financial serv-
ices firm that allegedly prepared fairness opinion included in proxy statement negligently
liable to all plaintiffs who relied on statement); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 694 F.
Supp. 1427, 1435-36 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (acknowledging Goodman, but adopting reason-
ably foreseeable approach for independent auditors only).
Several courts have rejected this balancing test as too difficult to apply. See Touche
Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 320-21 (Miss. 1987); Raritan
River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 214, 367 S.E.2d 609, 617
(1988).
Some courts have also adopted modifications of these three major approaches. See
e.g., Thayer v. Hicks, 243 Mont. 138, 146, 793 P.2d 784, 789 (Mont. 1990) (adopting
"modified version" of Credit Alliance); Selden v. Burnett, 754 P.2d 256, 260-61 (Alaska
1988) (adopting modified version of Restatement).
103. See, e.g., Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684-85 (E.D. Ky. 1981)
(allowing third-party shareholder action in negligent misrepresentation against account-
ant under Kentucky law); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91-93 (D.R.I.
1968) (same under Rhode Island law); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131, 132-33,
356 S.E.2d 198, 199-200 (1987) (same under Georgia law); Raritan River Steel, 322 N.C.
at 214, 367 S.E.2d at 617 (same under North Carolina law).
104. See, e.g., Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (D. Del. 1991)
(applying Restatement approach to investment bankers); Dowling v. Narragansett Capi-
tal Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1124-25 (D.R.I. 1990) (same); Vereins-Und Westbank v.
Carter, 691 F. Supp. 704, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying Ultramares rule for accountants
to attorney); Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1386
(Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (applying Restatement rule to designing engineer); Robert & Co v.
Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250 Ga. 680, 680-82, 300 S.E.2d 503, 503-04 (1983) (same);
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 232 Neb. 477, 480, 441 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1989)
(extending privity requirement for attorneys to accountants); Stotlar v. Hester, 92 N.M.
26, 28-29, 582 P.2d 403, 406-07 (N.M. Ct. App.) (applying Restatement rule to appraiser
for negligent appraisal), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978); Ossining Union
Free School Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 424, 539 N.E.2d 91,
94-95, 541 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338-39 (1989) (applying Ultramares rule for accountants to
engineer); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200, 202-03, 514
N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987) (applying Ultramares rule for accountants to investment
bankers), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d
517, 524-25 (1988), Cook Consultants, Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (applying reasonably foreseeable approach for accountants to surveyor liable
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1. The Ultramares Approach
The most restrictive approach is derived from the seminal case on pro-
fessional liability in negligence, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven &
Co.." s In Ultramares, the New York Court of Appeals, speaking
through Judge Cardozo, limited the scope of accountant liability for pe-
cuniary harm caused by negligence to those who had a "contractual rela-
tion, or... one approaching it" with the accountant."°6 Although Judge
Cardozo intimated that actual privity would not be required,l17 courts
later interpreted Ultramares to demand strict privity for all types of pro-
fessional liability suits based on negligence."I A few jurisdictions have
maintained this interpretation of Ultramares, which precludes third-
party suits. 09
to landowner for negligence in completing survey under contract with building contrac-
tor). But see Klein, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,002, at
95,615 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990) (claiming that under California law, a separate stan-
dard exists for independent auditors of financial statements); Donnelly Constr. Co. v.
Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 188-89, 677 P.2d 1292, 1296-97 (Ariz. 1984) (ap-
plying Restatement to architects); Hoffman v. Greenberg, 159 Ariz. 377, 380, 767 P.2d
725, 728 (Ct. App. 1988) (limiting professional liability to "that which could have been
imposed on contractual basis").
105. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
106. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. With Ultramares, the New York Court of Appeals
stemmed the deterioration of the privity doctrine that it had initiated in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916). The MacPherson
court extended an auto manufacturer's duty of care to all those whom its product could
foreseeably have injured. See id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
107. When distinguishing the auditor in Ultramares from the public weigher whom the
court had held liable to a third party in the earlier decision of Glanzer v. Shepard, 233
N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922), Judge Cardozo noted that the weigher's knowledge of the
use of the weight certificates created a "bond ... so close as to approach ... privity."
Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446. Judge Cardozo later declared that the
third party in Glanzer to whom the accountant owed a duty of care was "in effect, if not
in name, a party to the contract." Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446; see supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
108. See Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 15, at 156-57 & n.36; see also Gormley, The
Foreseen, the Foreseeable, and Beyond-Accountants' Liability to Nonclients, 14 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 528, 532 & n.22 (1984) ("Ultramares came to symbolize a requirement of
privity of contract which in hindsight appears to be a more rigorous requirement than
Judge Cardozo may have intended"); Note, Attorney Liability to Third Parties for Corpo-
rate Opinion Letters, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 415, 430 & n. 103 (1984) (courts viewed Ultramares
"as holding that accountants owe no duty of care to those persons not in privity of con-
tract with them"); see, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir.) (interpreting
Ultramares as allowing third-party liability against accountants only in cases of fraud),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937); Thornton v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 380 A.2d 593,
595 (D.C. 1977) (insurer owed no duty to third parties); Birkenmeyer & Co. v. Home-
stead Minerals, 32 Colo. App. 258, 262, 510 P.2d 449, 451 (1971) (corporation not liable
for losses caused by negligence of its stock transfer agent).
109. See, e.g., Bryant Elec. Co. v. Fredicksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1193-96 (4th Cir.
1985) (under Virginia law, in the absence of privity, architectural and engineering firm
not liable for purely economic loss resulting from firm's negligence); Investors Tax Shel-
tered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815,
817-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (accounting firm not liable for negligence to a third-
party investment firm), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1980); Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Kennedy & Coe, 232 Neb. 477, 480, 441 N.W.2d 180, 182 (1989) (accounting firm not
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One group of courts, led by the New York Court of Appeals,"' has
construed the Ultramares view of professional liability less restric-
tively,"' requiring only "constructive privity" as a basis for liability.' 2
Focusing on Ultramares's "approaching privity" language," 3 these
courts impose a duty upon accountants and other professionals when (1)
the professional actually foresees the likelihood of the third party's reli-
ance on the representation for a particular purpose," 4 and (2) there is
conduct by the professional linking him to the third party.'" The second
requirement-linking conduct-is difficult yet essential to define because
it distinguishes the Ultramares approach from the Second Restatement's
actually foreseen standard. Courts usually require that the parties have
some preexisting relationship or nexus that ensures that the professional
actually foresaw the third party's reliance.'" 6 Nevertheless, whether in-
liable to third party); Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Community Gen. Hosp.
Ass'n, 54 Ohio St. 3d 1, 8, 560 N.E.2d 206, 212 (1990) (m absence of privity, architec-
tural designing firm not liable for purely economic damages resulting from inaccurate
drafting plans).
110. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 483 N.F_.2d
110, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1985). The Credit Alliance court refused to require actual privity
to find an accountant liable for negligence causing mere pecuniary damage. See id at
551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443.
111. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 827 F.2d 155, 161-62 (7th Cir. 1987)
(interpreting Indiana law as following Credit Alliance); Colonial Bank v. Ridley &
Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390, 395 (Ala. 1989) (adopting Credit Alliance in Alabama); Idaho
Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp, 115 Idaho 1082, 1084, 772 P.2d 720, 722 (Idaho
1989) (adopting Credit Alliance in Idaho); Thayer v. Hicks, 243 Mont. 138, 146, 793 P.2d
784, 789 (1990) (adopting "modified version" of Credit Alliance in Montana); see also
Ossining Union Free School Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 424-
25, 539 N.E.2d 91, 94-95, 541 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338-39 (1989) (applying Credit Alliance to
engineers).
Some courts and commentators claim that Credit Alliance and its progeny modified the
Ultramares standard. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 311 (W.
Va. 1989) (noting an apparent modification despite the New York Court of Appeals'
declaration to the contrary); Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 15, at 163 (acknowledging a
modification, but describing it as slight). But see Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 551, 483
N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443 (claiming that court's new test did not depart from
the principles of Ultramares); Siliciano, supra note 78, at 1940 (Credit Alliance merely
affirmed the continuing validity of Ultramares).
112. Credit Alliance has been interpreted as requiring "constructive privity." See Cof.
fee, supra note 22, at 6, col. 6.
113. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
114. This is a combination of the first two prongs of the Credit Alliance test: "(1) the
accountants must have been aware that the financial reports were to be used for a particu-
lar purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was
intended to rely." Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at
443.
115. See Toro, 827 F.2d at 161-62; Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d
390, 395-96 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank, 115 Idaho at 1084, 772 P.2d at 722; Credit Alliance,
65 N.Y.2d at 551, 483 N.E.2d at 118, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443; see also Thayer, 243 Mont. at
149, 793 P.2d at 791 (conduct not necessary, but must show that third party's reliance
relates to particular transaction of which accountant is aware when preparing audit).
116. See, e.g., Colonial Bank, 551 So. 2d at 395 (accountant had no previous contact
with bank that would inaicate his awareness of bank's reliance on audits); Ossining
Union Free School Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d 417, 425-26, 539
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terpreted as requiring actual or constructive privity, Ultramares remains
the most restrictive of the three major approaches in defining the scope of
professional liability to third parties in negligent misrepresentation.
The Ultramares rule aims to prevent excessive liability. 1 7 This goal
stems from two broad policies: (1) applying stricter scrutiny to third-
party claims arising from purely economic loss; and (2) allowing private,
nonjudicial constraints, such as a profession's self-regulation and a pro-
fessional's concerns about reputation, to control the risks involved in
transactions requiring reliance on a professional's expertise." 8 Ul-
tramares protects the professional from unlimited liability by limiting the
number of persons that may reasonably rely on the professional's repre-
sentation to those in privity-or "approaching privity"-with the profes-
sional. It also considers broadening professional liability a "matter for
legislative rather than judicial reform.""' 9 Ultramares, however, has
been criticized for overprotecting the tortfeasor at the expense of the
injured. 120
N.E.2d 91, 95-96, 541 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (1989) (consulting engineer's "direct contact"
with third-party school district alerted it to school's reliance). Such "conduct" has in-
cluded a third-party school's authorization to retain defendant sub-contractors, who
billed the school directly, see id at 425-26, 539 N.E.2d at 94-95, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 339; and
investment bankers rendering fairness opinions that they knew the directors would in-
clude in the proxy statement to the shareholders, see Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am.
Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200, 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988). In
finding that no such conduct existed, the Credit Alliance court emphasized that the ac-
countant had neither dealt directly with the plaintiffs, agreed with its client to prepare an
audit for the plaintiffs' use, nor provided plaintiffs with a copy of the audit. See Credit
Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 553-54, 483 N.E.2d 110, 119,
493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 444-45 (1985); see also Colonial Bank, 551 So. 2d at 396 (conduct
insufficient to alert accountant of third-party bank's reliance, even though accountant
gave multiple copies to client and contacted bank as part of standard audit procedures).
For a discussion of the Restatement approach, see infra notes 130-35, 164-78 and ac-
companying text.
117. See Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 179-80, 189, 174 N.E. at 444, 448.
118. See Siliciano, supra note 78, at 1951-59. But cf Note, Fairness Opinions, supra
note 1, at 127-30 (arguing that existing market and legal controls fail to protect share-
holders who rely on negligently rendered fairness opinions).
119. Ossining Union Free School Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 N.Y.2d
417, 425, 539 N.E.2d 91, 95, 541 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (1989).
120. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968) ("Why
should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's
professional malpractice?"); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 351-52, 461 A.2d
138, 152-53 (1983) (same) (quoting Rusch Factors); Wiener, Common Law Liability of the
Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 San Diego L. Rev. 233,
252 & n.95 (1983) (because no undue burden will result from the extension of liability,
innocent third parties should not be required to bear disastrous amounts of financial loss)
(citing Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962)). But see Siliciano, supra note 78, at 1955-58
(Ultramares provides sufficient protection for third party injured by accountant's
negligence).
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2. The Reasonably Foreseeable Approach
A second view, the reasonably foreseeable approach, is the least re-
strictive and most recent of the three major standards. First imposed by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 121 this approach extends a profes-
sional's duty to third parties whose reliance on the professional's repre-
sentation was foreseeable, notwithstanding the professional's lack of
actual knowledge of the third parties' reliance."n This view rejects the
protection that Ultramares gave professionals in negligent misrepresenta-
tion 123 and suggests that, as long as there is foreseeable harm, all
tortfeasors should be responsible for their acts regardless of privity.124
The policies underlying the reasonably foreseeable rule focus less on
the defendant and more on the interests of the plaintiff and society in
recovery by (1) compensating the injured; (2) deterring negligent conduct
by forcing the professional to bear the burden of resulting financial
losses; and (3) holding professionals to the same scope of duty as other
potential tortfeasors. 125 Those advocating the reasonably foreseeable ap-
proach suggest that professionals can insure themselves to protect against
the overwhelming liability that a class of foreseeable plaintiffs might cre-
ate.126 In the context of investment banking, the expansion of liability to
121. In 1983, the New Jersey Supreme Court first adopted the reasonably foreseeable
approach in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 NJ. 324, 352-53, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983).
New Jersey's highest court was influenced by California appellate judge Howard B. Wie-
ner, see id, at 352, 461 A.2d at 153, who published an article that same year recom-
mending the expansion of an accountant's duty of care to all parties whose reliance was
reasonably foreseen at the time of the audit. See Wiener, supra note 120, at 259-60
(1983); Note, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably Unreasonable Extension of an
Auditor's Legal Duty, 48 Alb. L. Rev. 876, 890-91 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Foreseeably
Unreasonable].
122. See. e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 322-
23 (Miss. 1987) (involving reliance on accountant's audit); Rosenblum, 93 NJ. at 352,
461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (same); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis.
2d 376, 386, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983) (same); ef In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig.,
694 F. Supp. 1427, 1435-36 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (construing California law as adopting rea-
sonably foreseeable approach for independent auditors only).
123. See Rosenblum, 93 NJ. at 333, 352-53, 461 A.2d at 142, 153; Wiener, supra note
120, at 260; see also Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903-04, 451
A.2d 1308, 1311-12 (1982) (modern accounting profession no longer in need of judicial
protection provided by Ultramares to a then "fledgling profession"). But see Siliciano,
supra note 78, at 1950 (arguing that Judge Cardozo's reasoning in Ultramares cannot be
dismissed simply as "outdated protectionism").
124. See Rosenblum, 93 NJ. at 341, 461 A.2d at 146-47; Citizens State, 113 Wis. 2d at
386, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
125. See Rosenblum, 93 NJ. at 352-53, 461 A.2d at 153; Wiener, supra note 120, at
260; supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 NJ. 324, 349 & n.11, 461 A.2d 138, 151
& n.11 (1983) (reasonably foreseeable approach does not threaten accountant industry
because accountants can protect themselves from indeterminate liability by buying insur-
ance).
In the investment banking context, reliance on insurance is unnecessary as investment
bankers often have indemnification clauses in their engagement letters. See infra notes
175-76 and accompanying text.
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all foreseeable parties might enhance the independence of the investment
banker's fairness opinion by making an investment banker more con-
cerned about rendering an accurate fairness opinion than securing share-
holder support for its clients.'27 The reasonably foreseeable approach,
however, has been criticized for analogizing professional liability to prod-
uct liability 2 ' and for failing to distinguish between the negligent profes-
sional and the deceitful professional.' 29
3. The Second Restatement's Actually Foreseen Approach
The Second Restatement's actually foreseen approach, the majority
view, 13 extends a professional's duty to "a person or one of a limited
group of persons" whose reliance on the representation the professional
could actually foresee.13 1 Unlike the reasonably foreseeable approach,
the Restatement approach limits a professional's scope of duty for negli-
gent misrepresentations to those whose reliance was foreseen-not
merely foreseeable-and retains a broader duty for reckless and inten-
tionally fraudulent misrepresentations. 132
The Restatement's actually foreseen approach achieves a compromise
between the policies of Ultramares and the reasonably foreseeable ap-
proach. This approach balances "the need to hold accountants to a stan-
dard that accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world
with the need to protect them from liability that unreasonably exceeds
the bounds of their real undertaking."'' 33 It compensates the injured
127. See Note, Fairness Opinions, supra note 1, at 135; Note, Standard of Care, supra
note 69, at 112; Stuntebeck & Withrow, supra note 61, at 23, cols. 2-3. For a discussion
of why an investment banker's fairness opinion might be unreliable, see supra notes 43-57
and accompanying text.
128. See Gormley, supra note 108, at 552-54; see also Note, Foreseeably Unreasonable,
supra note 121, at 904-09 (noting that not all courts allow for economic recovery under
products liability and that misrepresentations of manufacturers differ greatly from those
of auditors).
129. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
130. See First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 312 (W. Va. 1989). The Re-
statement approach was first adopted in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85,
91-93 (D.R.I. 1968). Many courts have since adopted this approach. See, e.g., In re
Hawaii Corp., 567 F. Supp. 609, 617-18 (D. Haw. 1983) (applying Hawaii law to ac-
countants); Ingram Indus. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (applying
Kentucky law to accountants); Robert & Co v. Rhodes-Haverty Partnership, 250 On.
680, 680-82, 300 S.E.2d 503, 503-04 (1983) (applying Georgia law to engineers); Spherex,
Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903-04, 451 A.2d 1308, 1311-12 (1982)
(applying New Hampshire law to accountants); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry,
Bekaert & Holland, 322 N.C. 200, 214, 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (1988) (applying North Car-
olina law to accountant).
131. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(2)(a) (1965). Ultramares also distin-
guishes negligent from fraudulent misrepresentations by not limiting professional liability
for gross negligence. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 188-
89, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931).
132. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 comment a (1965); Gormley, supra note
108, at 570.
133. Raritan River Steel, 322 N.C. at 215, 367 S.E.2d at 617.
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while limiting the number of parties that may rely upon a professional's
representations and to which it could potentially be held liable. Never-
theless, although the Restatement approach has the "potential for an op-
timal balance,""M it too has flaws. For example, by requiring the
professional to know of the third parties at the time of the representation,
but not at the time the client engages the professional, the Restatement
approach may subject the professional to liability disproportionate to the
risk that it assumes at fee negotiations.'35 On the other hand, the U/-
tramares approach limits the possibility of disproportionate harm by re-
quiring either privity or preexisting conduct between the parties.' 36
B. The Investment Banker Cases
Few courts have addressed third-party negligent misrepresentation
claims against investment bankers who negligently performed fairness
opinions. '37 Three of these courts agreed that an investment banker
owed a duty to third-party shareholders when it negligently rendered a
fairness opinion upon which shareholders relied, but differed on the
scope of that duty. 131
134. Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 15, at 190.
135. See id. at 190. The authors note that this might be avoided by creating "an excep-
tion from liability for uses or users not reasonably identified at the time of the engage-
ment contract." Id. at 190-91
136. For a discussion of these two interpretations of the Ultramares approach, see
supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the various interpreta-
tions of what conduct Ultramares requires, see supra notes 115-16 and accompanying
text
137. See Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (D. Del. 1991); Dow-
ling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1124-25 (D.R.I. 1990); Klein v.
King, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990); Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d
200, 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11,
24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988).
Two other cases are worth noting. In 1987, the Third Circuit permitted shareholders
to recover against an investment banker for a showing of negligence in a federal securities
action under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See Herskowitz v.
Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054 (1989).
The investment banker had erroneously concluded in its fairness opinion that Nutri/
System's income would continue to be taxed for the next five years at the then-existing
corporate tax rate of 46%, despite the near certainty that Congress would soon adopt the
tax reform legislation before it at the time. See id. at 183-84. Following precedent that
scienter was not required in actions against management under Section 14(a), Chief Judge
Gibbons reasoned
since an investment banker rendering a fairness opinion in connection with a
leveraged buyout knows full well that it will be used to solicit shareholder ap-
proval, and is well paid for the service it performs, we see no convincing reason
for not holding it to the same standard of liability as the management it is
assisting.
Id. at 190.
The other case worth highlighting is Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 159 A.D.2d
291, 296-97, 552 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (1st Dep't 1990). For a discussion of Schneider, see
infra note 162 and accompanying text.
138. See Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1124-25; Klein, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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In Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp.,139 a federal district court in
Rhode Island relied on the Restatement to find that investment bankers
owed a duty to shareholders they actually anticipated would rely on their
fairness opinion.1" The court reasoned that the Ultramares policy con-
cern with exposing professionals to indeterminable liability was not at
issue in the investment banker-shareholder context, because the plaintiffs
in this case belonged to a limited class whose reliance was actually
foreseen. 
14 1
In Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 42 a New York
court applied the Ultramares approach and inferred that the shareholder-
investment banker relationship, which arose from a special committee's
retention of two investment bankers to advise the shareholders, ap-
proached one of privity. 41 Not surprisingly, the court offered no policy
to justify its extension of the Ultramares approach to investment bank-
ers:"4 the New York Court of Appeals had previously applied its Ul-
tramares approach to engineers, 14 stating that Ultramares might apply
to professionals other than accountants. 146
Rep. (CCH) % 95,002, at 95,602, 95,615; Wells, 127 A.D.2d at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
The fourth case, Brug, 755 F. Supp. at 1258-59, did not state that an investment banker
would never owe a duty in negligent misrepresentation to third-party shareholders. Rec-
ognizing that Delaware courts have followed the Restatement standard to determine the
extent of liability for negligent misrepresentation by professionals, the federal court in
Delaware applied the Restatement standard to the shareholder-plaintiffs' claim of negli-
gent misrepresentation. It dismissed the shareholder-plaintiffs' cause of action, however,
because it held that they were not part of the "limited group" for whose benefit the
information in the public statements was intended:
the only documents which plaintiffs identify as containing the alleged misrepre-
sentations are ones that were released to the public at large. If any member of
the public who might choose to invest in [the issuer's] common stock were to
qualify as part of a protected class, then the "limited group" requirement [of the
Restatement approach] would be meaningless.
Id. at 1259.
139. 735 F. Supp. 1105 (D.R.I. 1990).
140. See Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1125. The investment banker's assessment of the
proposed purchase price "was patently intended to guide shareholders in deciding
whether to approve the sale." Id
141. See id The court concluded that the investment banker's duty to exercise reason-
able care was extended to its client's shareholders because the banker's "assessment was
patently intended to guide shareholders in deciding whether to approve the sale." Id.
142. 127 A.D.2d 200, 514 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 72
N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988).
143. See id. at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2. The Wells court reasoned that the duty the
investment bankers owed to their client, a special committee formed to determine the
deal's fairness for the shareholders, could be extended to the company's shareholders.
See id. at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2. The court also noted that the investment bankers
must have been aware that their opinion would be used to help shareholders decide on
the fairness of the merger offer. See id at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2 (citing Credit Alli-
ance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 551, 483 N.E.2d 110, 118, 493
N.Y.S.2d 435, 443 (1985)).
144. See id. at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
145. See Ossining Union Free School Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73
N.Y.2d 417, 424, 539 N.E.2d 91, 94-95, 541 N.Y.S.2d 335, 338-39 (1989).
146. See id. at 424, 539 N.E.2d at 94-95, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 338-39.
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Finally, in Klein v. King,147 a federal district court in California con-
sidered both the reasonably foreseeable standard and a policy-balancing
test148 in the evaluation of a shareholder claim of negligent misrepresen-
tation by an investment banker. The shareholders asserted that the in-
vestment banker played a substantial role in the business of the
corporation and in the publication of the proxy statement. 14 9 In holding
that the investment banker owed a duty to the shareholders under their
negligent misrepresentation claim, however, the court did not explicitly
adopt either formula.1 50
Dowling, Wells and Klein offer little guidance on the appropriate scope
of the investment banker's duty to third-party shareholders. These
courts merely announce which approach they have chosen without dis-
cussing the underlying concerns.
C. The Appropriate Scope of Duty for Investment Bankers" The
Restatement's Actually Foreseen Approach
Despite the paucity of cases involving shareholders' negligent misrep-
resentation claims against investment bankers, numerous cases exist that
involve negligent misrepresentation actions against other professionals,
including accountants, lawyers and engineers. 151 Based on these deci-
sions and the role of the investment banker in corporate control transac-
tions, the appropriate scope of the investment banker's duty in negligence
actions brought by third-party shareholders is the Restatement's actually
foreseen approach. 152
The Ultramares view imposes unnecessary restrictions on the liability
of the investment banker by responding to policy concerns that are less
relevant in the investment banker-fairness opinion context than in the
accountant-audit context. For instance, third-party shareholder claims
theoretically pose less of a threat of indeterminable liability to investment
147. [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 95,002, at 95,599 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 26, 1990).
148. See id at 95,615. For a discussion of this balancing test, see supra note 102.
149. See id. at 95,610-11. In Klein, a federal court in California refused to dismiss a
shareholders' negligent misrepresentation claim against a financial services firm that pre-
pared a fairness opinion attached to the proxy statement in a merger. See idL at 95,610,
95,615. The shareholders claimed that the investment banker culpably participated in the
dissemination of false information that depicted the potential success of the merger as
being overly favorable. See id at 95,602. The court held that all defendants, including
the investment banker who participated in preparing the proxy statement, owed a duty to
shareholders who relied on the statement. See id. at 95,615.
150. On the defendants' motion to dismiss the third-party shareholders' claim of negli-
gent misrepresentation, the court concluded: "Based on the plaintiffs' allegations that all
defendants, including [the investment bankers], culpably participated in the preparation
of the allegedly false and misleading proxy statement, the Court holds that the defendants
owed a duty to all plaintiffs who relied on the statement." Id at 95,615. Whether the
court adopted the reasonably foreseeable standard or the balancing test, see generally
supra note 102 (discussing the balancing test), is unclear from this conclusion.
151. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
152. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1965).
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bankers than do similar claims against accountants. The shareholders
compose the class of potential plaintiffs, as they are the group for whose
benefit the information was intended.1" 3 This class is limited and fore-
seen: 154 even the largest corporation has a finite number of shareholders
that the investment banker can identify in advance;I s further, the invest-
ment banker's engagement letter, which its lawyers help craft, mentions
whether the investment banker's opinion will appear in communications
to shareholders.156 Although an accountant might know who initially
receives its audit, it is more prone to indeterminable liability because an
audit has more uses than an investment banker's fairness opinion.157
Although knowledge of the number of shares is insufficient in and of
itself to determine the extent of an investment banker's potential liabil-
ity, 5 s it is one piece of the potential liability puzzle that investment
bankers have and accountants lack.
Furthermore, it may be unjust to grant an investment banker the pro-
tection that Ultramares offered accountants. An accountant's fee is neg-
ligible in relation to what a corporation pays an investment banker for its
opinion. 59 Ultramares's reliance on private ordering to encourage the
153. See Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1258-59 (D. Del. 1991).
154. See Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1124-25 (D.R.I.
1990); Note, Standard of Care, supra note 69, at 114 n.96; cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Craw-
ford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 313 (W. Va. 1989) (imposing standard of care only to known users
not a "commercially unreasonable rule").
Of course, if the investment banker disseminated information to the public at large, a
shareholder could not claim to be part of a limited class for whose benefit the information
in the public statements was intended. See Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp.
1247, 1259 (D. Del. 1991); supra note 138.
155. For the huge corporations whose shareholders might number well into the
thousands, calling a shareholder class "limited" might seem specious. Nevertheless, even
with the largest corporation, an investment banker can technically determine the number
of shares that are publicly held and thus the amount of risk assumed. It can then bring
its estimate to the fee negotiations. Cf. Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 15, at 192-93 (dis-
cussing how accounting firms may better control liability when dealing with a known
number of recipients). Accountants, however, cannot define their potential liability as
easily because an audit has many users, including "government agencies, investors, credi-
tors, unions and other interested parties." Practicing Law Institute, Accountants' Liabil-
ity 78 (1981); see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 345, 461 A.2d 138, 149
(1983) (discussing numerous uses of audit).
156. Investment bankers normally attempt to limit expressly the persons to whom they
owe duties. See Drafting Indemnification Agreements, supra note 42, at 13.
157. For example, audits help to inform management of potential business problems,
to satisfy SEC requirements, to garner funds from banks and other lending institutions,
and to acquire credit from suppliers of goods and services. See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at
345, 461 A.2d at 149.
158. Determining the number of shares that an investment banker may be liable for
serves little purpose unless an investment banker can also project the price that a judge
will later decide falls within a range of fair prices.
159. For a discussion of an investment banker's fees, see supra note 48 and accompany-
ing text. Arguably, an investment banker may deserve greater protection than an ac-
countant because its fairness opinion involves numerous presumptions and projections
often made under tremendous time pressures. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the variables involved in the valuation process. Conversely, an
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professional to apply its expertise more carefully is less tenable in the
context of investment banking than of accounting, because investment
bankers lack the industry standards for performing fairness opinions that
accountants have for making audits."6 Moreover, the resilience of pro-
fessions such as accounting for almost three decades under the Restate-
ment standard also disproves Ultramares's fear of unlimited liability.' 1 ,
One indication that the Ultramares approach may be too restrictive in
the investment banking context is a New York court's artful evasion of
Utramares's near-privity requirement to find a duty between an invest-
ment banker and shareholders., 62 The Restatement approach, by con-
trast, allows courts to avoid altering basic corporate law when the
"approaching privity" standard of the Ultramares approach"6 is not
met. 1
64
The Restatement approach also satisfies the most fundamental con-
cerns of those advocating the reasonably foreseeable approach: it com-
pensates injured shareholders who form a limited and foreseen class 65
and deters investment bankers from acting negligently. Adopting the
reasonably foreseeable approach instead of the Restatement approach
accountant's audit entails more certain, mathematical calculations. Most investment
bankers, however, are so familiar with the routine of valuation that they can perform
fairness opinions perfunctorily. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
160. See Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 7, at 85.
Courts have also allowed recovery for negligent misrepresentation despite the U!-
tramares concern for limiting recovery for pecuniary loss. See supra note 97 and accom-
panying text.
161. See Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1125 (D.R.I.
1990).
162. See Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 159 A.D.2d 291, 296-97, 552 N.Y.S.2d
571, 574-75 (1st Dep't 1990). In holding an investment banker liable to the shareholders,
this New York appellate court redefined the relationship between a special committee of
directors and shareholders as one of agency. See id. at 296, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75. The
court reasoned that the shareholders were in privity with the investment banker because
the investment banker was hired by a special committee whose primary function was to
obtain the highest price possible for the shareholders' stock. See id at 296, 552 N.Y.S.2d
at 574-75. Schneider's reasoning has startled observers. See supra note 77. Its finding of
privity fundamentally confuses the legal relationship between directors and shareholders.
See Wachtell, Roth & Houston, supra note 77, at 4, col. 2. "It is well-settled law that
directors are not agents of the shareholders, or even the corporation." Id.; see H. Henn &
J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 207, at 562-63 (3d ed. 1983); see also Continental
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16-18, 99 N.E. 138, 141-42 (1912) (discussing relation-
ship between directors and shareholders); Coffee, supra note 22, at 6, col. 4 ("[D]irectors
are not agents in the classic master/servant sense, but rather their relationship is sui
generis and involves a level of discretionary authority that most agents do not
posses[s].").
163. For a discussion of this standard, see supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
164. As some commentators have pointed out: "Are the shareholders, as 'principals',
to be deemed personally liable for any 'torts' committed by their 'agents' in the conduct
of an auction?" Wachtell, Roth & Houston, supra note 77, at 4, col. 2; see also Coffee,
supra note 22, at 6, col. 4 (questioning Schneider's interpretation of shareholder-director
relationship).
165. For a discussion of limited and foreseen in the shareholder context, see supra
notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
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places undue burdens on bankers when balanced against the risk they
assume. Although investment bankers earn high fees,166 the reasonably
foreseeable approach would expose them to liability that is potentially
disproportionate to their wrongdoing if liability is extended to a class of
third-party shareholders neither limited nor foreseen by the investment
bankers.1 6 7 Admittedly, indemnification agreements, which are com-
monly found in engagement letters, might limit an investment banker's
exposure to liability.168 Nevertheless, corporations may be less willing in
the future to indemnify investment bankers if more courts hold that in-
vestment bankers owe a duty to third-party shareholders when rendering
fairness opinions on which the shareholders rely.
The Restatement approach also avoids some common criticisms of the
reasonably foreseeable approach. Unlike the Restatement approach, the
reasonably foreseeable approach's extension of liability creates incentives
for unknown third parties to make fraudulent or exaggerated claims
against investment bankers. 169 In addition, the reasonably foreseeable
approach unfairly allocates to the investment banker unbargained-for
risks, as the investment banker may be liable to any foreseeable plaintiff
that reasonably relies on its fairness opinion, regardless of whether the
banker intended to render the opinion for that plaintiff's purpose. 17  The
Restatement approach affords investment bankers, especially those who
are unable to obtain an indemnification agreement from its client, more
of an opportunity17 1 to avoid unfair risk allocations by providing them
with one variable-the number of shares outstanding-that may help
them to negotiate a fee that reflects the added exposure to financial risk
when management circulates their opinion to the shareholders.' 72
166. For examples of investment banker fee structures, see supra note 48.
167. Cf Siliciano, supra note 78, at 1944-48 (merely foreseeable test poses these dan-
gers to accountants); Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A
Reassessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513, 1537 n.74 (1985) ("The most persuasive basis for
maintaining the limited duty [for accountants] is a proportionality argument").
For an example of how the Restatement approach limits the investment banker's liabil-
ity to the public at large, see Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247, 1259 (D.
Del. 1991), discussed in supra note 138.
168. Indemnification agreements may appear in engagement letters or constitute a sep-
arate agreement. See Drafting Indemnification Agreements, supra note 42, at 23. For
further discussion of indemnification agreements, see infra notes 175-76 and accompany-
ing text.
169. Cf. Siliciano, supra note 78, at 1947 (merely foreseeable test poses this "moral
hazard[" to accountants).
170. For a discussion of the justifications and criticisms of the reasonably foreseeable
approach's extension of the professional's duty to foreseeable plaintiffs, see supra notes
125-29 and accompanying text.
171. This opportunity may be severely limited, however, by the inherent unpredictabil-
ity of a court holding that retrospectively determines what would have been a fair price,
especially given that a court may be deciding this issue years after the actual transaction.
172. Cf Bagby & Ruhnka, supra note 15, at 192 (discussing the ability of accountants
to negotiate for a fee with knowledge of all intended uses of the audit). The Restatement
approach offers the investment banker a better opportunity to measure its potential liabil-
ity at the time of fee negotiations, because the number of outstanding shares is known.
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For further protection from liability disproportionate to their under-
taking, investment bankers may attempt to limit those that may reason-
ably rely on the fairness opinions via express clauses within their
engagement letter and, subsequently, their opinions."13 Express dis-
claimers may help prove that investment bankers justifiably did not fore-
see the shareholders' reliance.1" 4 The investment banker may also
negotiate to limit its liability through the use of indemnification provi-
sions and procedural clauses, such as jury waiver or forum selection
clauses. All of these devices are common to most investment-banker en-
gagement letters17 and should be disclosed in the fairness opinion to
counter shareholders' claims of reliance most effectively. 76
Finally, the Restatement approach does not shield investment bankers
absolutely; it exposes investment bankers to enough liability to create in-
centives for them to act as quasi-investigative agents in management
Few companies perform public offerings-a common method of increasing a corpora-
tion's capital-in the midst of a corporate control transaction. If such an offering were to
occur, courts could "create, or investment bankers could contract for, an exception for
uses... not reasonably identified at the time of the engagement contract." Bagby &
Ruhnka, supra note 15, at 190-91. In this way, an increase in the corporation's capital
after fee negotiations would not cause the investment banker undue hardship.
173. For discussions and examples of such disclaimers, see Rosenbloom & Aufses,
supra note 1, at 10-13; Drafting Indemnification Agreements, supra note 42, at 15-20.
174. Cf Hoffman v. Greenberg, 159 Ariz. 377, 380, 767 P.2d 725, 728 (Ct. App. 1988)
(disclaimer strengthened accountant's contention that it did not actually foresee a third
party's reliance, as disclaimer suggested that audit would be used to help client in deci-
sion-making process).
A disclaimer within an engagement letter, however, would not automatically protect
the investment banker from tort liability to third-party shareholders who relied on a neg-
ligently prepared fairness opinion. Tort obligations normally cannot be disclaimed be-
cause they are based on policy considerations independent of the parties' manifest intent.
See Prosser and Keeton, supra note 80, § 92, at 656. It follows that competing policy
considerations, such as those balanced in the Restatement approach, see supra notes 133
& 154-170 and accompanying text, may warrant exceptions to this general bar on dis-
claiming tort liability. Cf H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 NJ. 324, 351, 461 A.2d 138,
152 (1983) (in some circumstances, auditor could expressly limit number of persons who
could rely on audit); Prosser and Keeton, supra note 80, § 92, at 656 (extent to which tort
obligations may be impaired by contract depends largely "on the relationship between the
parties, the nature of the bargaining transaction, and the type of loss for which liability is
disclaimed").
The most effective disclaimer would appear in the fairness opinion and would limit the
investment banker's undertaking, not the opinion's dependability, because general dis-
claimers of reliability are insufficient. See First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310,
314-15 (W. Va. 1989); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 404 (Iowa 1969). If the invest-
ment banker sets forth its methods of valuation in its engagement letter and, subse-
quently, in its fairness opinion, it might limit the basis upon which injured parties could
sue it for misfeasance. See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text; cf Ryan, 170
N.W.2d at 404 (concerning accountants).
175. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 6, cols. 5-6; Brodsky, supra note 77, at 4, cols. 5-6;
Wachtell, Roth & Houston, supra note 77, at 4, col. 2. For a discussion and sample of an
investment banker's indemnification agreement, see Rosenbloom & Aufses, supra note 1,
at 12-13.
176. Courts, however, have historically hesitated before enforcing a party's attempt to
limit its liability to third parties. For a discussion of disclaimers, see supra note 174.
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buyouts that may involve fraud. 7' Thus, investment bankers protect
both themselves and shareholders by deterring opportunistic directors
and managers from acting inconsistently with the shareholders' inter-
ests. 1' Furthermore, courts could prevent an investment banker from
merely disclaiming any knowledge of the shareholders' reliance. If the
facts suggest that the investment banker should have known of the share-
holders' reliance, then courts should hold that the investment banker did
foresee this reliance. 79
In summary, the Restatement approach compensates injured share-
holders, deters investment bankers from rendering inaccurate fairness
opinions, and protects investment bankers from liability potentially dis-
proportionate to the risk they assumed. It reconciles two conflicting con-
cerns: overprotecting the investment banker at the expense of the
shareholder, and underprotecting the investment banker who must
render an opinion based on numerous variables and projections.
III. CLARIFYING THE STANDARD OF CARE
A. The Need for a Clear Standard of Care
Having delineated a duty between investment bankers and sharehold-
ers who have relied on the bankers' fairness opinions, courts must clarify
the standard of care that the duty mandates. Although third-party
shareholders may bring causes of action against negligent investment
bankers, shareholders may still lose on the merits. "As a practical mat-
ter, it may be difficult for [them] to prove that [the] investment bankers
were acting negligently."' 80 Generally, a person "who undertakes to
render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exer-
cise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that pro-
fession or trade in good standing in similar communities."'' Applying
this standard to investment bankers rendering fairness opinions poses
problems. The lack of industry guidelines governing the conduct of in-
vestment bankers, 8 2 the numerous variables and financial considerations
from which an investment banker may choose when preparing a fairness
opinion, 18 and the tremendous time pressures often associated with cor-
porate control transactions make the rendering of a fairness opinion
highly discretionary. With this discretion, investment bankers can deter-
mine that a widely differing array of bids fall within a range of fair prices,
177. For a discussion of how expanded liability will compel investment bankers to
conduct more objective analyses, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
178. See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 43, at 250.
179. See, eg., Wells v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 127 A.D.2d 200, 202-03,
514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (1st Dep't 1987) (investment bankers must have been aware of the
shareholders' reliance), rev'd on other grounds, 72 N.Y.2d 11, 24-25, 526 N.E.2d 8, 15-16,
530 N.Y.S.2d 517, 524-25 (1988).
180. Brodsky, supra note 77, at 3, col. 1.
181. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965).
182. See Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 7, at 85.
183. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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"all of which would be reasonable and none of which could be shown to
be 'wrong' (or unfair) under objective criteria." 18
In light of this situation, courts must clarify what a reasonable invest-
ment banker would do when rendering a fairness opinion. Delineation of
the standard of care would benefit (1) shareholders, because they could
identify viable claims and thus avoid fruitless legal costs; (2) investment
bankers, because they would know better how to avoid liability; and (3)
courts, because clarification would conserve judicial resources by al-
lowing more widespread use of dismissal and summary judgment
mechanisms.
B. Past Attempts at Clarification
Despite the lack of industry guidelines, few courts have attempted to
specify when an investment banker is acting negligently in rendering a
fairness opinion."8 5 Because the courts that have addressed investment
184. Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 7, at 29; see Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 43, at
252 n.155; see, e.g., Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 339 (Del. Ch. 1984) (estimates
ranging from $53 to $85 per share); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A2d 556, 566-67 (Del. Ch.
1977) (estimates ranging from $7.25 to $9.50 per share).
185. Curiously, few commentators have tried to fill this judicial void, as most commen-
tators have generally called for increased disclosure. See, eg., Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 107 (1986) (reformers
have sought to increase protection of shareholders via several means, including increased
disclosure); Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 43, at 251-52 (calling for fairness opinions
that include price evaluation, detailed explanation of data and assumptions underlying
estimate, and methodology used); Stuntebeck & Withrow, supra note 61, at 23, cols. 3-4
(bankers must "include a more thorough analysis of the relative weight given to the fac-
tors considered in rendering the [fairness] opinion").
Those commentators that have proposed more specific measures have been helpful. In
particular, Martin Lipton and Erica Steinberger assert that certain general procedures
should be followed:
(1) The opinion should describe the matters considered, those statements re-
lied upon without investigation, those statements or matters that have been in-
dependently verified, and the inherent limitations, if any, of any procedures or
standards that have been used.
(2) The opinion should describe the fee being paid, all relations with the cli-
ent, and any conflicts of interest. If the investment banker participated in the
negotiation of the transaction this should be noted in the opinion.
(3) The opinion should be updated to the latest possible date (although, when
an opinion is included in a proxy statement, it should be dated approximately
the date of such statement; it is not necessary to update it to the actual transac-
tion date, absent a material change in circumstances), and if that date is prior to
the date of the transaction the opinion should set forth that it is as of a specific
date and does not reflect matters thereafter.
(4) Counsel for the investment banker should assist in the due diligence review
and advise as to the kind of backup material which should be prepared.
(5) Independent verification of the key issues should be made.
(6) Where a key issue is legal, the opinion should state that the investment
banker has consulted and relied on counsel with respect to such issue.
(7) Where the opinion is to be used in a conflict transaction, the investment
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banker liability for negligence misrepresentation to third-party share-
holders have yet to reach the merits of these cases, I8 6 the appropriate
standard of care required of investment bankers awaits judicial definition.
In addition, in cases not involving negligent misrepresentation, courts
that have addressed the standard of care that the banker's duty imposes
have been unhelpful. They fail to specify what facts and assumptions the
investment banker must consider before rendering an opinion, and what
analytical methods it must use when making an opinion. Furthermore, it
is unclear what information the investment banker must disclose to avoid
negligent misrepresentation liability. For instance, in 1983, the Supreme
Court of Delaware declared that, when determining fair value, directors
may rely on investment banker opinions that consider all relevant facts
except those that are purely speculative. 18 7 This court, however, never
specified what factors were relevant."8 s Similarly, in a 1988 federal se-
curities case involving the possible negligence of investment bankers, the
Third Circuit adopted a general, objective test of liability: whether the
investment banker's assumptions were "objectively unreasonable in the
circumstances."' 8 9 Like the Delaware court, however, the Third Circuit
banker should be satisfied as to all the procedures to be used by the client, such
as committee of independent directors, vote of minority shareholders, use of
appraisers and other experts.
(8) The investment banker generally should not accept compensation which is
contingent upon consummation of the transaction or any other arrangement
that would impeach its independence in rendering a fairness opinion. The pro-
visions of the customary investment banker-target agreement providing for con-
tingent compensation in the event of improved or White Knight offers do not
constitute a contingency impeaching independence, and the customary two-part
fee with the second part being paid only if the opinion is used in a disclosure
document also does not impeach independence.
M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note 10, § 8.06[6], at 8-30 to -31 (footnotes omitted).
Professors Bebchuk and Kahan discourage courts from
specify[ing] in advance what assumptions bankers should make and what valua-
tion techniques they should use. Rather, courts should weigh an opinion de-
pending on whether it states a range of fair prices and on the extent to which its
conclusion is sensitive to its assumptions. Thereby, fairness opinions will con-
vey more information and investment banks will have less discretion.
Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 7, at 47 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Oesterle and Mr. Norberg have suggested that whenever advisors render
opinions with an indemnification agreement, specific and conspicuous disclosure should
be made to shareholders. See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 43, at 254. They also
suggest that any indemnification provision should be approved by a shareholders' vote or
by a special negotiating committee. See id.
Another commentator has suggested that bankers should be liable if they fail to use
more than one of the accepted methodologies for determining fairness. See Note, Fair-
ness Opinions, supra note 1, at 139.
186. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
187. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
188. See id,
189. Herskowitz v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1054 (1989). For further discussion of Herskowitz, see supra note 137.
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provided no specific guidance on what would be objectively reasonable
under the circumstances.
Because no court has set specific guidelines for rendering fairness opin-
ions, courts might consider borrowing an approach employed by courts
reviewing uncertified audits. In these cases, some courts have recognized
that an accountant may affect the parameters of its potential liability by
limiting its undertaking in the engagement contract.190 The accountant,
then, would be liable only for any negligently performed task outlined in
the contract. It would not be liable for failing to perform an additional
procedure not referred to in the contract.' 91 Like an accountant per-
forming an uncertified audit, an investment banker lacks official industry
guidelines for rendering a fairness opinion. 192 It follows that an invest-
ment banker might be able to limit the parameters of its potential liability
by describing its intended methods of valuation within its engagement
letter and, subsequently, within its fairness opinion. Unfortunately, this
approach also has its flaws'93 and is an inadequate alternative to clearer
judicial guidelines for the rendering of fairness opinions.
C. The Duties of an Investment Banker When
Rendering a Fairness Opinion
As an interim substitute to industry and judicial guidelines that specify
what investment bankers must investigate, consider and disclose when
rendering fairness opinions, courts and practitioners may seek guidance
from cases concerning directors' fiduciary and statutory duties of disclo-
sure. Because investment bankers lack the directors' fiduciary duty to
shareholders, they should not be held to every requirement that courts
have placed upon directors. Nevertheless, these cases best set forth judi-
cial expectations of dealing fairly with shareholders. The cases
researched include instances where courts held fairness opinions to be
sufficiently detailed to warrant directors' reliance. From these cases, a
three-pronged standard of care can be construed for investment bankers
who render fairness opinions upon which third-party shareholders rely:
(1) a duty to investigate; (2) a duty to perform a reasonable analysis; and
(3) a duty to disclose the bases for the opinion.
190. See Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 404 (Iowa 1969); First Nat'l Bank v. Craw-
ford, 386 S.E.2d 310, 314-15 (W. Va. 1989).
191. See Ryan, 170 N.W.2d at 404.
192. See Steinberg & Lindahl, supra note 7, at 85.
193. Theoretically, if the investment banker performs these procedures with reasonable
care, it should avoid liability even if other methods not referred to in the contract might
have rendered a more accurate valuation. This approach, however, assumes that (1) an
investment banker will know at the outset of its investigation exactly what methods it will
employ, and that (2) it will carefully choose which methods are most appropriate given
the information available. The numerous considerations that are associated with the val-
uation process may often render these assumptions misleading. Nevertheless, most in-
vestment bankers are familiar with the routine of valuation and, arguably, as
professionals, should be able to determine what procedures are necessary based on the
information provided.
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1. Duty To Investigate
Generally, an investment banker must merely disclose whether it in-
vestigated the subject corporation independently or whether it relied
solely on information supplied by management. 19 4 Nevertheless, some
courts have criticized investment bankers who rendered fairness opinions
based on data supplied solely by management.1 95 Most courts require
only that investment bankers disclose their lack of an independent inves-
tigation. 196 As a matter of policy, however, courts should demand an
independent investigation of any information that an investment banker
may obtain from sources other than management, especially when man-
agement has an interest in the deal's outcome and the banker is not sub-
ject to severe time or management constraints.
2. Duty To Perform A Reasonable Analysis
Courts have criticized fairness opinions that were made under fee ar-
rangements that were contingent upon the deal's outcome 197 or that were
either too conclusory,19 1 improvised or cursory. 199 Although courts have
194. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
195. See Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 789, 791-93
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
196. See infra note 226 and accompanying text; see also Goldstein v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,037, at 90,860 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 15, 1988) (no cause of action for nondisclosure).
Of course, merely reciting that the investment bankers made no independent analysis
of the transaction would not protect them from liability if they knew the directors' infor-
mation was false or if they recklessly rendered the opinion. See Richardson v. White,
Weld & Co., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,864, at 95,545
(S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1979).
197. These courts argue that an investment banker on a contingent fee may no longer
be an independent evaluator because it is inclined to skew a fairness opinion in favor of
satisfying the directors' interests. See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d
1112, 1122 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'don other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991);In re Appraisal
of Shell Oil Co., No. 8080 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1990) (1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 199, at *88);
cf Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing
investment banker as an interested "blocker" of transaction), rev'd on other grounds, 481
U.S. 69, 94 (1987); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 642 F. Supp. 917, 923
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Dynamics Corp. for appropriately criticizing hiring investment
bankers on contingent fee basis); Anderson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430, 441-42 (D. Minn.
1984) (refusing to dismiss aiding and abetting claim against investment banker because of
contingency fee).
Nevertheless, courts generally seem unconcerned about contingent fee arrangements;
judicial opinions often fail to mention that a contingent fee was given. See, e.g., Cottle v.
Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11 th Cir. 1988) (no mention of contin-
gent fee along with other transactional fees); Bebehuk & Kahan, supra note 7, at 49 &
n. 112 (same). Moreover, disclosure of an investment banker's contingent fee may suffi-
ciently notify investors of an investment banker's economic interest in a transaction. See
Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1314-15 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
198. See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1478-79 (6th Cir.
1987) (proxy statement's laundry list of fairness factors considered by investment bankers
in rendering their fairness opinion insufficient disclosure of transaction's fairness), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d
264, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1986) (directors cannot rely on fairness opinion that merely states
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recognized that corporations must often act on deals quickly,' no court
has allowed directors to use time constraints as an excuse to forego their
fiduciary duties to their shareholders of diligently investigating the fair-
ness of a deal."° Again, however, given the numerous variables involved
in the valuation process, most courts have recognized that the mere dis-
closure of the time constraints sufficiently puts the shareholders on notice
of possible problems. 2
3. Duty To Disclose The Bases For The Opinion
Disclosure of the bases for an investment banker's fairness opinion is
necessary to avoid fairness opinions that are too conclusory °3 and may
protect investment bankers from allegations that they misrepresented
their conclusions. The general rule of disclosure is that all material (or
"germane"' ) facts must be disclosed."°s To determine what informa-
tion a court might find material to rendering a fairness opinion, invest-
option prices were within range of fair value, particularly when quick appraisal unneces-
sary). But see Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,420, at 97,134 (Del. Ch. June 29, 1990) (allowing directors to
rely on an investment banker's financial advice despite lack of "formal opinion placing
specific dollar value or range of values" on corporation's stock); Kaplan v. Goldsamt,
380 A.2d 556, 567-68 (Del. Ch. 1977) (allowing directors to confirm their decision to
make transaction with two fairness opinions that lacked formality and detail; proxy state-
ment had merely said that both banking firms had approved offier price).
199. See, e.g., Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCII) 95,863, at 91,139 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976) (defendants cannot
rely on fairness opinion prepared "virtually overnight and without the necessary time and
deliberation for a fair evaluation"); EAC Indus. v. Frantz Mfg. Co., No. 8003, slip op.
(Del. Ch. June 28, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Del file, at 9) (director may not rely on
"improvised" fairness opinion), aff'd, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
200. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 n.53 (2d Cir. 1980)
(refusing to infer bad faith from board's hasty negotiations without other factual sup-
port); Estate of Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 155-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (di-
rectors' decision to act under imminent deadlines not necessarily breach of fiduciary
duty); Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,915, at 90,103-04 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (time limit imposed
by arm's-length adversary one factor suggesting board acted with due care), aff'd 569
A.2d 53, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,860, at 94,662 (Del.
1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,712-13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (special committee given
30 minutes to accept proposal not liable for its hasty decision).
In the absence of time constraints, however, hasty decisions suggest that a board may
have breached its fiduciary duty to shareholders. See, e.g., Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275
(paucity of information and swiftness of decision suggested breach of fiduciary duty).
201. See, e.g., EACIndus., No. 8003, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 28, 1985) (LEXIS, States
library, Del file, at 9) (improvised fairness opinion one factor suggesting that attempted
ratification of deal was "mere window dressing"); cf Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798
F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986) (business judgment rule does not protect independent direc-
tors' rubber stamping of management's buyout proposal); Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 274-
75 (directors must make informed decisions).
202. See notes infra 217-18 & 225 and accompanying text.
203. See cases listed in supra note 198.
204. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985) (" 'germane'
means material"); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 1977) (defin-
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ment bankers may analogize to cases that have held directors liable for
failing to disclose material facts. Examples of material facts that might
result in liability if undisclosed include:
a. Information Contradicting The Price's Fairness: additional infor-
mation that suggested a price given may have inadequately reflected pres-
ent market value, such as the value of the company's holdings; 2°6 the
magnitude of a corporation's reserves;207 a corporation's recent quarterly
earnings;"2 the riskiness of the debentures offered;209 the extraordinary
increases in a company's inventory and its short-term debt;210 an in-
sider's report that higher cash price was a good investment; 211 the man-
agement's estimate of value;212 the majority shareholder's authorization
prior to a tender offer of open-market purchases of a target company's
shares at a price twenty-five percent higher per share;213 and the lowest
price that the stock had traded in five years, when the directors estab-
lished the premium at this price;214
b. Information Concerning Other Influential Transactions: the likeli-
hood of another transaction that would have a financial impact on the
subject deal, such as when the directors had information on the status of
an impending merger that was likely to affect the company, and when the
board claimed that it reviewed the prospective financial conditions of the
ing germane as information that "a reasonable shareholder would consider important in
deciding whether to sell or retain stock").
205. See e.g., Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 571, 473 N.E.2d 19,
27, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 675 (1984) (requiring "complete and candid disclosure of all mate-
rial facts" known to majority shareholder or board members, "including their dual roles
and events leading up to merger proposal"); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
711-12 (Del. 1983) (requiring that outside directors and minority shareholders receive
"material" information); Lynch, 383 A.2d at 281 (rejecting as insufficient lower court's
finding that only disclosure of adequate-not material-facts was necessary).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's definition of when an omitted fact is material
in federal securities cases and its adoption by state courts, see supra note 88 and accompa-
nying text. Note that federal securities disclosure requirements vary in strictness depend-
ing on type of transactions involved. For example, the disclosure requirements for a
proxy statement in a freeze-out merger are more extensive than in other types of deals.
See Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 254-55 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903
(1986).
206. See Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1119 (D.R.I.
1990).
207. See Lockspeiser v. Western Md. Co., 768 F.2d 558, 561 (4th Cir. 1985).
208. See In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1427, 1430, 1434 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
209. See id
210. See Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 827-28 (D. Del.
1974).
211. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 (Del. 1983).
212. See Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 342-43 (Del. Ch. 1984). In Joseph, the
court also held that the corporation's oil discovery was a material nondisclosure. See id.
at 343.
213. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 281-82 (Del. 1977).
214. See Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1060, [1987-88
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,544, at 97,446 (Del. Ch. 1987).
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subject company;215
c. Details Of An Investment Banker's Investigation: a reasonably de-
tailed analysis of the investment banker's valuation methods and the
weight it attached to each method 216
d. The Cursory Performance Of A Fairness Opinion: it is necessary to
disclose that a fairness opinion was done over a long weekend,21 but
unnecessary to disclose that investment bankers only had a few days to
prepare for their briefing to the board on fairness when they had a month
to prepare the written opinion;218
e. Conflicts Of Interest:219 such conflicts have included directors
who recommended a merger to shareholders after they already had been
selected to the prospective company's board,' and an investment
banker who opined on a deal's fairness while purchasing the subject com-
pany's debentures;"2
f. Prior Business Relationships Between Investment Bankers And Cor-
porations: these scenarios include an investment banker who rendered a
fairness opinion for the target company and was also a long-time director
of the purchasing corporation;' m an investment banker who had been the
advisor of a corporation for two years before rendering a fairness opinion
on a merger involving that corporation;' m and an investment banker
who had a prior and continuing advisory relationship with the maker of
the tender offer;' 4
g. The Contingent Nature Of Investment Bankers' Fees: especially
when a large portion of the investment banker's fee was contingent upon
shareholder approval of the client's interests22--i.e., garnering share-
215. See Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., 519 A.2d 116, 125 (Del. Ch. 1986).
216. See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470, 1479 (6th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
217. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983); Eisenberg, 537 A.2d
at 1060, [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,544, at 97,446; Joseph
v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 343 (Del. Ch. 1984).
218. See Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 489, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
219. See Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 572, 473 N.E.2d 19, 27, 483
N.Y.S. 667, 676 (1984).
220. See Anderson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430, 438 (D. Mlum 1984).
221. See Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
222. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 706 (DeL 1983).
223. See Klein v. King, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec, L Rep. (CCH) 95,002,
at 95,610-11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990); see also Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F.
Supp. 66, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (past rendition of services to corporation involved in deal
raised doubts about investment banker's impartiality when opining on fairness), modified,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
224. See Goldstein v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep.
(CCH) 94,037, at 90,860-61 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 1988).
225. See Wallerstein v. Primerica Corp., 701 F. Supp. 393, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); An-
derson v. Boothe, 103 F.R.D. 430, 436 (D. Minn. 1984); Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp.
1302, 1315 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A2d 952, 958-59 (Del. Ch.
1980); see also Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., No. 10755 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 7, 1991) (1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7, at *17) (omission of "facts surrounding compensa-
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holder support to achieve or prevent a change in corporate control.
h. The Lack Of Independent Investigations By Investment Bankers:
especially when information was supplied solely by an interested board of
directors; 226 and
i. Managements'Limitations On The Scope Of The Investment Bank-
ers' Investigations: directors have limited the scope of information avail-
able to an investment banker concerning the value of the company's
assets227 and the type of buyer that an investment banker may seek when
shopping the company.22
On the other hand, the following information need not be disclosed:
(a) simple mathematical calculations or deductions; 229
(b) matters of public knowledge, 230 such as information available in
periodicals; 23
1
(c) unquantifiable benefits of transactions, 232 although courts are split
on a general rule for disclosing "soft information";233
tion of investment banker potentially material in a management-buyout transaction when
corporation sold without resorting to public auction"). For examples of contingent fees,
see supra note 48.
226. Courts have held that directors mislead shareholders when they failed to disclose
that their investment bankers relied on information supplied solely by the directors. See
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972); Denison Mines Ltd. v. Fibreboard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 812, 821-22 (D.
Del. 1974); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1352 (Del. Ch. 1981) (not-
ing that failure to disclose such information would have resulted in liability), rev'd on
other grounds, 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
227. See Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1119 (D.R.I.
1990); see also Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341-42 (Del. Ch. 1984) (holding
that directors' failure to disclose tender offeror's withholding from investment banker
information about oil reserves was both breach of fiduciary duty and failure to make full
disclosure).
228. See Braunschweiger, No. 10755 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1991) (1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7,
at *9-14).
229. See, e.g., Wallerstein v. Primerica Corp., 701 F. Supp. 393, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(no need to give greater prominence to fee arrangement-shareholders could deduce that
investment banker may have favored its clients' interests); Howing Co. v. Nationwide
Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1985) ("there may be sound business reasons for
not making" certain quantifications in the proxy statement), rev'd on other grounds, 826
F.2d 1470, 1477-78 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); Richland v. Cran-
dall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("[C]orporations are not required to address
their stockholders as if they were children in kindergarten."); cf Eliason v. Hamilton,
No. 81-123 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1987) (1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1826, at *13-14) (reasonable
investor could discount any fairness opinion rendered by buying company's investment
banker, because it generally seeks to attain lowest price); Spielman v. General Host
Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (investors need not be "spoonfed" informa-
tion), aff'd, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
230. See Seibert v. Sperry Rand Corp., 586 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir. 1978).
231. See Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1144 (D. Or. 1984).
232. See Efros v. Nationwide Corp., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,077, at 95,120 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 1983). Indeed, directors could possibly
expose themselves to legitimate charges of misrepresentation if they attempted to quan-
tify the anticipated advantages. See Howing, 625 F. Supp. at 152.
233. Soft information is "valuation data based upon 'forwardlooking' information or
estimates." Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., 519 A.2d 116, 126-27 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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(d) events occurring after the issuance of a fairness opinion or proxy
statement, unless material changes have occurred;
(e) every approach made by would-be acquirers;"
(f) concerns about takeover attempts;236
(g) faithless motives, unless they "translat[e] into actionable deeds or
omissions both objective and external";" 7 and
Such information includes asset valuations and financial projections. See Dowling v.
Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1118 (D.RtI. 1990).
Some courts reject soft information as unreliable per se. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 292 (7th Cir.) (no duty to disclose financial projections), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d
Cir. 1973) (no duty to disclose asset appraisals). Other courts, however, require disclo-
sure of calculations that can be made with reasonable certainty. See e.g., Starkman v.
Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985) (no duty to disclose financial fore-
casts unless they are "substantially certain"), cerL denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Vaughn
v. Teledyne, Inc. 628 F.2d 1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) (no duty to disclose unless esti-
mates made with "reasonable certainty"). Yet other courts adopt a case-by-case ap-
proach, refusing to reject soft information per se. See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enter., 44
F.2d 978, 988 (3d Cir. 1984) (asset appraisals not immaterial per se, but rather should be
disclosed when potential aid of such information outweighs potential harm of undue reli-
ance); Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1118-19 (adopting Flynn's balancing test); Rio Grande
Indus., 519 A.2d at 129-30 (finding that pro forma statements on prospective financial
conditions fail Flynn's balancing test).
In the merger context, the Supreme Court has held that the materiality of information
"depends on the probability that the transaction will be consummated, and its signifi-
cance to the issuer of the securities." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).
Courts should determine materiality in this context on a case-by-case basis. See id.
Soft information must be disclosed if it is curative: management has made partial or
erroneous disclosures whose accuracy depends upon further disclosure of soft informa-
tion. See, eg., Dowling, 735 F. Supp. at 1119 (directors disclosed information on the
value of company holdings, but failed to divulge further information showing higher
value for holdings).
234. See Lewis v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., No. 8720 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1990) (1990
Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *19-20); Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., No. 6293 (Del.
Ch. May 6, 1988) (1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 64, at *25-27); cf SEC v. Manor Nursing Cen-
ters, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1095-96 (2d Cir. 1972) (seller of securities must inform inves-
tors of developments subsequent to effective date of registration that render statements
contained in prospectus materially false or misleading); Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp.
1465, 1483 (D. Or. 1985) (accountant's audit need only consider subsequent events that
render audit false or misleading); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 441 F. Supp. 525, 548-49
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same).
An investment banker does not have a continual duty to analyze events subsequent to
the date of the fairness opinion, although some bankers do withdraw their opinions if
subsequent events render their opinions misleading. See, eg., FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 727
F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (N.D. IM. 1989) (mvestment banker threatened to withdraw its opin-
ion unless corporation's board increased its offer to match increase in the corporation's
stock price).
235. See Panter, 646 F.2d at 296.
236. See, eg., Rand v. Western Airlines, Inc. [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) t 94,751, at 94,053 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 1989) (no violation for failure to
disclose immaterial bid); Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., No. 10755
(Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 1990) (1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 7, at *20-21) (must only disclose material
bids).
237. Carapico v. Enflo Corp., No. 85-4974, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 1986) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file, at 5).
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(h) purely internal valuations.2 38
Regardless of which assumptions and valuation methods the invest-
ment banker ultimately chooses when opining on fairness,239 the above
cases suggest that an investment banker may avoid liability by thor-
oughly disclosing the suppositions and techniques on which its opinion is
based, especially its material assumptions. At times, full disclosure may
be difficult, if not impossible, as the valuation may involve material non-
public information, such as an investment banker's trade secrets or infor-
mation that would endanger a corporation if publicly disclosed. The
above lists do suggest, however, that the more thorough the investment
banker's investigation and disclosure, the less likely a court finding of
negligent misrepresentation liability. It may seem unjust that an invest-
ment banker might avoid liability for a shabby investigation of a com-
pany or a poor analysis of the relevant factors simply by disclosing these
conditions within the fairness opinion. Given the complexity of the valu-
ation process and the time constraints of corporate control transactions,
however, this leeway may be a necessary evil in the context of these ex-
traordinary deals. Courts, however, should hold bankers liable for the
financial harm that arises from the reasonable reliance on a negligently
prepared fairness opinion by an intended recipient of the opinion when
neither the complexities of the valuation process nor the time constraints
so often associated with corporate control transactions are at issue.
CONCLUSION
Investment bankers owe third-party shareholders a duty of reasonable
care in preparing fairness opinions. Courts, however, should limit the
scope of this duty to correlate to the risks investment bankers foresee and
assume during fee negotiations. This approach would appropriately bal-
ance the need to account for investment bankers' current role in the fi-
nancial world with the need to shield them from liability that
unreasonably surpasses the bounds of their actual undertaking. Finally,
in the absence of clear judicial or industry guidelines, investment bankers
can draw the best guidance on the standard of care that they owe third-
party shareholders from cases that have measured whether fairness opin-
ions and proxy statements were sufficiently detailed to warrant a board's
reliance upon them.
Michael W. Martin
238. See Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614, 625 (7th Cir. 1986); Panter v. Mar-
shall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981). But see Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 280-81 (Del. 1977) (corporation violated duty to disclose its internal
valuations that showed target company to be worth more than price paid).
239. For a discussion of the variables inherent in the valuation process and the tech-
niques available to the investment banker, see supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
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